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Overview 
 
Part 1 of the thesis reviews the literature on the measurement of 
mentalization in adult clinical populations. As mentalization is a broad multi-faceted 
term, the search incorporates the related concepts of Theory of Mind (ToM) and 
Emotional Intelligence (EI) as these have been widely operationalised. The review 
presents a framework for different types of measures, including performance-based 
tasks and self-report questionnaires, and considers their relative psychometric 
strengths. It finds an absence of any one measure that covers the breadth of the 
mentalization construct, however, a set of recommendations are made for an 
optimal approach using currently available tools. 
Part 2 presents an empirical study of the relationship between mentalizing 
capability and severity of Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD) in an offender 
sample. The results show that some specific mentalizing measures were able to 
modestly predict severity of ASPD. These were the ability to take the perspective of 
another person, the ability to read mental states from the „eyes‟ and a general 
inability to mentalize. These findings suggest that a greater understanding of 
mentalizing capacities in people with ASPD may support improved risk assessment 
and clinical treatments. The study‟s limitations are considered and its implications 
for further research and practice. 
Part 3 presents a critical appraisal of the process of undertaking this 
research. It describes some of the challenges to joint working across the NHS and 
the Criminal Justice System. It considers how the use of psychometric assessment 
can be improved in an ASPD/offender population. It builds on the literature review to 
recommend how the operationalisation of mentalization can be further enhanced. 
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Abstract 
 
Aims  
Mentalization is a broad multidimensional concept. This review assesses 
whether mentalizing can be reliably measured in adults, where differences are likely 
to be fine, in a way that is relevant to the real world. 
 
Method  
The search looked for measures of mentalization, theory of mind and 
emotional intelligence used in clinical settings with adults. 
 
Results 
145 references were identified, of which 122 were consistent with the search 
parameters. From these: 28 measures of mentalization were found; 11 were 
excluded using the review criteria; 2 were added from other sources. A total of 19 
measures were reviewed. 
 
Conclusions 
Their relative psychometric strengths were assessed. No comprehensive 
measure of mentalization was found. It is recommended that a battery of tests be 
deployed and further design criteria are suggested. 
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1   Introduction 
Mentalization is outlined in Fonagy‟s (1991) original definition as “the 
capacity to conceive of conscious and unconscious mental states in oneself and 
others” (p641). Mental states include desires, needs, feelings, thoughts, beliefs and 
fantasies (Allen, Fonagy, & Bateman, 2008). In emphasising the key role of emotion, 
mentalization has also been described as “thinking and feeling about thinking and 
feeling” (Allen et al., 2008, p63). Mentalization has been growing in importance as a 
construct for understanding psychopathology (Choi-Kain & Gunderson, 2008). 
Mentalization deficits have been described in relation to autism (Baron-Cohen, Ring, 
Moriarty, & Schmitz, 1994), dementia (Lough, Gregory, & Hodges, 2001), 
personality disorder (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009), schizophrenia (Corcoran, Mercer, & 
Frith, 1995), and various brain lesion studies (Channon & Crawford, 1999). 
Furthermore, Allen et al (2008) suggest that mentalization is crucial to delivering 
effective therapies.  
As well as appearing relevant for a range of clinical presentations, 
mentalization is a broad concept, multi-faceted and multi-dimensional (Allen et al., 
2008). In fact, Choi-Kain and Gunderson (2008) argue that it is too broad to be 
operationalised. Unless a construct can be defined and measured, it is not open to 
empirical research (Geher & Renstrom, 2004). This review set out to find if a 
psychometrically robust mentalization measure is available to discriminate amongst 
adults.  
Firstly, definitions of mentalization will be explored to inform the review 
question and literature search parameters. The results of the search will be 
analysed to identify a shortlist of measures, which will then be examined in depth. 
The aim is to outline a way ahead for the measurement of mentalization. 
 
 
5 
 
 
2   Mentalization: issues of definition and measurement 
The fundamental clinical aspects of mentalization are attending to mental 
states such as desires, needs, feelings, beliefs and reasons, (Bateman & Fonagy, 
2008) of oneself and others, coupled with implicit or explicit awareness that these 
are representations of reality from one of many perspectives (Allen et al., 2008; my 
italics). At the same time, mentalization is an inclusive term that has meaning across 
a range of psychological disciplines. 
Mentalization has been referred to in the psychoanalytic literature as a 
super-ordinate concept encompassing processes of representation, symbolisation 
and abstraction; top of a hierarchy supporting mental elaboration and psychic 
transformation (Lecours & Bouchard, 1997). In contrast, Fonagy (1991) introduces 
mentalization by taking theory of mind and placing this into an object relations and 
developmental frame. In attachment theory, the ability to reflect on one‟s own mind 
and empathise with the thoughts and feelings of others is nurtured by the baby‟s 
interaction with the mother in a secure bonding (Bowlby, 1977). Conversely, in a 
negative attachment, the child may defend against early neglect or trauma by 
disregarding the thoughts and feelings of the primary object or parent as it would be 
too painful to acknowledge the hurt being inflicted (Fonagy, Steele, Steele, Moran, & 
Higgitt, 1991). Whilst initially functional, it is theorised that this impairs the person‟s 
mentalizing capability in the long-term and, in later situations of stress, these early 
responses of “decoupling” from one‟s own and others‟ mental states re-emerge 
(Fonagy & Bateman, 2006). Mentalization is not confined to a psychoanalytic 
perspective. 
Choi-Kain and Gunderson (2008) place mentalization alongside mindfulness, 
psychological mindedness, empathy and affect consciousness. Allen et al (2008) 
add: mindreading, theory of mind, metacognition, reflective functioning, emotional 
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intelligence and insight. In trying to distinguish mentalizing1 as a construct, Allen et 
al (2008) propose five criteria. The activity should focus exclusively on mental 
states. These mental states should include both the self and others. The processes 
of cognition and emotion should be integrated rather than working separately. The 
theory should be developmental with individual differences explained via the risk of 
impairments and different pathways. It is a capability which is open to change, in 
contrast to a fixed trait. It is the breadth encompassed in these criteria that makes it 
so difficult to operationalise. This breadth also distinguishes mentalization from other 
social cognition constructs such as theory of mind, emotional intelligence and 
empathy. However, these concepts are important as they have been 
operationalised.  
Theory of Mind (ToM) (Premack & Woodruff, 1978) is often used 
interchangeably with mentalizing. ToM encapsulates the ability to understand and 
predict one‟s own and others‟ attributions and intentions. It has proved particularly 
useful in defining developmental stages of social cognition. Initially a baby is unable 
to differentiate its own mind from its carer‟s (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). 
The shift from an egocentric social viewpoint to an acknowledgement that others 
have thoughts that are different in content from one‟s own normally occurs from 
about the age of four. These competencies have been operationalised in ToM tests. 
A 1st order false belief test is the ability of a child, typically by the age of 3-4,  to 
understand that another person can hold a mistaken belief; that other people may 
not know what they know (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). A 2nd order false belief, usually 
acquired by age 6-7, is the ability to represent a person recognising the false belief 
of another person; a belief about a belief (Perner & Wimmer, 1985). By the age of 9-
11, children usually achieve the more demanding understanding of a faux pas 
(Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 1998). This requires an appreciation that one can 
have knowledge the other is unaware of, accompanied by the empathic 
                                                     
1
 Mentalizing is different from mentalization by emphasising it as an activity (Allen et al, 2008). 
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understanding of what might upset or insult someone. This description recognises 
the integration of reasoning and emotional understanding. Allen et al (2008) and 
Lecours (1997) refer to a person‟s capacity to form a theory of mind as the product 
of basic mentalization processes. 
Whilst defining developmental milestones in children, these definitions have 
also proved valuable in assessing mentalizing deficits in clinical groups such as 
autism, schizophrenia or certain brain impairments. Autism has been described as a 
ToM deficit (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), whereby the inability to reflect on what 
another person might be thinking lies at the root of their social difficulties. In people 
with schizophrenia, positive symptoms such as paranoia have been linked to an 
impairment in the ability to infer the mental states of others (Corcoran et al., 1995). 
Whilst these groups have demonstrated impairments in 1st and 2nd order false belief 
tasks, such measures are insufficiently demanding for most adults. 
ToM is predominantly about cognition in relation to others and has little to 
say about the role of emotion. Emotional thinking has been developed into an 
influential theoretical model (Emotional Intelligence (EI); Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & 
Sitarenios, 2001). Their model has four branches in a hierarchy of abilities starting 
with perceiving emotions, then using emotions to facilitate thought, understanding 
emotions and, at its apex, managing emotions so as to support personal growth. 
There are other theories of EI (e.g., Lumley, Gustavson, Partridge, & Labouvie-Vief, 
2005), however, the common added value of these models lies in the centrality of 
emotion and a focus on both the self and others. Like ToM, EI has been 
operationalised with a number of measures.  
ToM and EI have both been broadened in response to identified limitations, 
which increases their overlap with the mentalization terrain. So, ToM started as a 
primarily cognitive development with a greater emphasis on the other than the self. 
However, in their modularity model (Baron-Cohen, Golan, Wheelwright, & Hill, 
2004), an „emotion detector‟ and „empathising system‟ were added, which 
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acknowledged emotions and self-reflection. Emotional Intelligence (EI) is close to 
mentalizing in its central focus on emotional expression, understanding and 
regulation, as well as including the self and the other. However, Mayer et al (2001) 
also described the competence of accessing emotion in thought. 
The question being reviewed is:  
Can mentalizing be reliably measured in adults? What measures of 
mentalizing have been developed for adults and what are their 
strengths and weaknesses in terms of validity, reliability and utility? 
In summary, mentalizing is inclusive, complex and multidimensional. 
However, its unity as a construct and operationalisation are questionable. The 
related concepts of ToM and EI have been operationalised but their scope is too 
narrow. In specifying the search for a measure of mentalization, this related family of 
concepts was employed: mentalization, ToM and emotional intelligence. Empathy 
was excluded as it is included within most definitions of EI, and its general use 
makes it too broad to be helpful. 
The other focus of the search was for mentalization measures relevant to 
adults. The capability to mentalize develops through childhood, adolescence and 
into adulthood (Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010). Most research assessing 
mentalizing abilities has focussed on child development and socially impaired 
clinical groups. This has resulted in „ceiling‟ effects for adults and this review aims to 
find measures that can identify fairly nuanced differences in mentalization that are 
relevant to the real world.  
 
3   Method 
In order to explore the review question a search was carried out using the 
following method. Measures eligible for inclusion were those that: 
i. Evaluated individual differences in mentalizing; 
ii. Were appropriate for adults, 18+; 
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iii. Provided sufficient description and relevant psychometrics; 
iv. Were written in English. 
The search strategy identified relevant measures by: 
a) Keyword searches of electronic databases (Psychinfo; Embase; Web of 
Science; Medline). 
 The basic search string was: (mentali*ing OR mentali*ation OR theory of 
mind OR emotional intelligence)  
 AND (measure* OR test* OR task* OR scale*) to be within 3 words of the  
above to optimise the likelihood of a relationship between the 2 terms2; 
 Limits: (i) human; (ii) English language, (iii) 1990-April 2011, (iv) Adults 
18+, (v) Clinical studies; (vi) Peer Reviewed journal. 
b) Personal contacts; 
c) Looking further at references in studies found from the above search to find 
new references. 
 
4   Results: Output of Search and Shortlisting of Measures for Analysis 
The search of databases resulted in 145 references. Some did not meet the 
initial criteria: not being studies about „adults‟ (22); and, not using clinical 
populations (1)3. The remaining 122 references were reviewed and 28 actual 
measures were identified: Appendix A1 lists these by their original study, showing 
where they were replicated and in what clinical condition. Table 1 details 11 
exclusions for not fitting the review question.  
 
 
 
                                                     
2
 By specifying that the main term and the linked term be 3 or less words apart, this reduced the 
number meeting the search criteria from  410,  when the two terms were specified anywhere in the 
abstract, to 145. 
3
 Given the author‟s intention to research mentalization in an offender population, any studies found 
with this group were included. 
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Table 1 
Reason for exclusion Measures excluded 
  
1) Adapted from child research 
and being insufficiently 
demanding. 
3 False Belief tasks (Perner et al., 1985; Baron-
Cohen et al., 1985; Baron-Cohen, 1989); 
Animations Task  (Abell, Happe, & Frith, 2001); 
Cartoon Task (Woolfe, Want, & Siegal, 2002). 
 
2) Based on earlier measures 
unless demonstrating 
additional novelty. 
False Belief Stories Task (Corcoran & Frith, 2003); 
Cartoon Picture Stories (Brune & Bodenstein, 
2005). 
 
3) Not being a mentalization 
task. 
Predicaments Task (Channon et al., 1999) - 
presented as a general problem-solving task. 
 
4) Weak or unavailable 
psychometrics (unpublished; 
no assessment of external 
validity; an experimental group 
of N<10). 
Projective Imagination Test  (Blackshaw, 
Kinderman, Hare, & Hatton, 2001); 
Abbreviated Trustworthiness Task (Adolphs, 
Tranel, & Damasio, 1998); 
Social Attribution Task (Klin, 2000). 
 
 
By personal contact with leading researchers4, another 2 measures were 
added to the list - Reflexive Self-Function Test (Fonagy et al., 1991) and the 
Perspectives Test (Dumontheil et al., 2010) - leaving a total of 19 for detailed 
examination that fitted the original definition. In order to facilitate the process of 
analysis, these shortlisted measures were categorised on the basis of test type and 
mentalization sub-domain. Test type defines the mode of delivery to the participant 
varying from: self-report to performance of a task, with the latter covering: written, 
sound or picture (still or moving); and, verbal or non-verbal. These types are 
important in understanding the demands of each test and any possible confounding 
aspects. Mentalization has been defined across three sub-domains (Choi-Kain et al., 
2008; Allen et al., 2008): implicit and explicit functioning; relating to self or other; and 
involving cognitive or affective aspects. These categorisations are used to indicate 
the mentalization scope of each measure in Table 2 below.  
                                                     
4
 The following made suggestions for possible mentalization measures for able adult populations: 
Professor Simon Baron-Cohen, Dr Janet Feigenbaum, Professor Peter Fonagy, Professor Chris Frith, 
Professor Patrick Luyten, Dr Woodbury-Smith. 
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Table 2 
Shortlisted Measures by Test Type and Dimensions of Mentalization (N=19). 
Measure (in order of 
publication) 
Test/task type Dimensions  of mentalization 
  Implicit/ 
explicit 
Self/ 
other 
Cognitive/ 
Affective 
Facial Emotion recognition  
(Ekman & Friesen, 1976) 
 
Performance task: 
pictorial stimuli 
Explicit Other Affective 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
(Davis, 1983a)  
 
Self-report 
questionnaire 
Implicit/ 
Explicit 
Self/Other Affective/ 
Cognitive 
Reflexive Self-Function Test 
(Fonagy et al., 1991)  
 
Independent rating 
scale 
Implicit Self/Other Affective/ 
Cognitive 
Strange Stories (Happe, 1994)  Performance task: 
verbal stimuli 
Implicit Other Cognitive 
Hinting Task  
(Corcoran et al., 1995)  
 
Performance task: 
verbal stimuli 
Implicit Other Cognitive 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes 
(Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, 
& Robertson, 1997; Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 
2001) 
Performance task: 
pictorial stimuli 
Explicit Other Affective/ 
Cognitive 
Bell Lysaker Emotion Recognition 
Test (Bell, Bryson, & Lysaker, 
1997)  
Performance task: 
audio-visual stimuli 
Explicit Other Affective 
Picture Sequencing Story-telling 
task (Langdon et al., 1997)  
Performance task: 
pictorial /verbal 
stimuli 
Implicit/ 
Explicit 
Other Affective/ 
Cognitive 
Picture Stories Inference Intention 
Task (Sarfati, Hardy-Bayle, 
Besche, & Widlocher, 1997)  
 
Performance task: 
pictorial stimuli 
Implicit/ 
Explicit 
Other Affective/ 
Cognitive 
Emotional Intelligence (Schutte et 
al., 1998)  
 
Self-report 
questionnaire 
Implicit/ 
Explicit 
Self Affective/ 
Cognitive 
Faux Pas (Stone et al., 1998)  Performance task: 
visual/verbal stimuli 
Implicit Other Affective/ 
Cognitive 
Cartoon Task (Happe, Brownell, & 
Winner, 1999)  
Performance task: 
pictorial /verbal 
stimuli 
Implicit/ 
Explicit 
Other Affective/ 
Cognitive 
MSC EIT (Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, 
& Sitarenios, 2003)  
Performance tasks: 
pictorial /verbal 
stimuli 
Implicit/ 
Explicit 
Self/Other Affective/ 
Cognitive 
Awkward Moments Test (Heavey, 
Phillips, Baron-Cohen, & Rutter, 
2000)  
Performance task: 
audio-visual film 
Implicit/ 
Explicit 
Other Affective/ 
Cognitive 
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Sarcasm Comprehension Task 
(Channon, Pellijeff, & Rule, 2005)  
 
Performance task: 
verbal stimuli. 
Implicit Other Affective/ 
Cognitive 
Movie for Assessing Social 
Cognition (Dziobek et al., 2006)  
 
Performance task: 
audio-visual film 
Implicit/ 
Explicit 
Other Affective/ 
Cognitive 
Cambridge Face-Voice Battery 
(Golan, Baron-Cohen, & Hill, 2006) 
  
Performance task: 
audio-visual stimuli 
Implicit/ 
Explicit 
Other Affective 
Yoni Cartoon Eye gaze inference 
task (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007) 
  
Performance task: 
visual/verbal stimuli 
Implicit/ 
Explicit 
Other Affective/ 
Cognitive 
Perspectives Task (Dumontheil et 
al., 2010)  
Performance task: 
audio-visual stimuli 
Implicit Self:Other Cognitive 
 
 
The 19 measures cover a broad range of test types and all of the dimensions 
of mentalization, although measures considering how people view their own mental 
processes are scarce. These measures are now assessed for the robustness of 
their psychometrics in terms of validity, reliability and utility.  
 
5  Critical analysis of validity, reliability and utility of mentalization measures 
This section analyses the relative psychometric strengths of the measures, 
using criteria of reliability, validity, utility and statistical power.  
Reliability is the extent to which output measures are consistently 
reproduced, usually assessed by three possible methods. Firstly, where an answer 
is open to interpretation, rather than being obvious as with „yes/no‟ or multiple 
choice, inter-rater reliability (IRR) is a measure of correlation for the marks of two or 
more raters for the same answers. Secondly, test results may vary when repeated; 
therefore, a test-retest score correlates the results of the same participant in the 
same conditions after a period of time has elapsed. For groups of people, the 
replication of results in different studies for the same group over time would indicate 
reliability. A difficulty is that the change found over time may be real. Therefore, 
reliability should be understood as consistency over a period in which the function 
being measured is stable.  Thirdly, a reliability coefficient of internal consistency 
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indicates the extent to which the items in the test all target the construct the 
measure purports to assess.  
Validity is a more varied concept relating to whether the test measures what 
it intends to. Campbell and Fiske‟s (1959) framework captures the main 
considerations. Firstly, criterion or external validity is the extent to which there is 
convergence with similar measures. This might be looked at concurrently with 
another measure taken at the same time for the same construct. Or, it may be 
predictive of a future event, for example, does a test of IQ predict exam success? 
For a new test, it may be compared with existing widely accepted tests. Secondly, 
the construct validity refers to how well a measure truly represents what it is aiming 
to measure. An approach to this is its ability to discriminate between clinical and 
normal groups with different behaviours or capabilities according to an explanatory 
theory. There is also the important consideration of face or ecological validity - does 
the task match the relevant real world demands?  
Utility refers to cost-effectiveness and user-friendliness. In assessing aspects 
of reliability and validity, there are inherent tensions and trade-offs in arriving at an 
optimum test. For example, the techniques to achieve internal reliability will usually 
employ highly selected and homogenous samples. This poses a threat to the 
external validity as these standards may be less meaningful in the real world. 
Furthermore, there is a likely trade-off between the speed of administration or the 
length of the test and the internal consistency of the items in the test. 
In considering the application of measures, the statistical concept of power is 
important. Power is the probability of successfully finding an effect if one exists. It 
relates to the design of the study and can mean a study may be undermined by a 
lack of power, which is most likely to result from too small a sample and/or a small 
effect size. A lack of power may not mean the measure is weak; it just means that 
conclusions cannot be drawn from that particular study. In the main, „under-
powered‟ studies were excluded.  
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The psychometric properties of the 19 measures are summarised in Table 3.  
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Table 3 
Shortlisted Measures with Summary of Psychometrics (N=19). 
 
Measure  Reliability Validity  
 Sample N, 
matched/ 
controlled for: 
Test-
retest 
Replic 
ation
5
 
IRR Internal Discriminant: 
between-group
6
 
 
Convergent:  
between measures 
Facial Emotion 
Recognition 
(Ekman et al., 
1976) 
  4 70%    Predictive of emotion: 88% 
 Also: autism; autonomic failure; 
epilepsy; schizophrenia 
 
Interpersonal 
Reactivity 
Index (Davis, 
1983a)  
156 and 1,344 
students, 
  gender 
r=.62 
to .71 
5 n/a 4 scales: 
r=.71 to 
.77 
 Social competence, self-
esteem, emotionality, sensitivity 
to others. 
 Gender (p<.05) 
 Also: ASPD; autism; 
depression. 
 Empathic concern to 
emotional reaction (p<.01) 
 Perspective-taking to social 
functioning (p<.05) 
Reflexive 
Function Test 
(Fonagy et al., 
1991)  
200 pre-natal 
parents 
 socio-
economic 
n/a X r=.7 to 
.75 
   Mother‟s AAI scores @ 12m 
(r=.7 to 1.0) 
 Child‟s security of attachment 
 Mother‟s coherence (AAI) 
(r=.51) 
 Strange Situation Observer 
ratings: avoidance (r=.37, 
p<.001); contact 
maintenance (r=.30, p<.002) 
Strange 
Stories 
(Happe, 1994)  
Autism: 18 
Controls:  
 Children 26 
 Mental health 
13 
 Adult 10 
? IQ 
 Comprehens‟n 
Age effects 
found in later 
X 16 85%  3/12 
story 
types  
 Initial study: (F(3,63)=18.4, 
p<.0001);  
 Also: autism; autonomic failure; 
bipolar disorder; brain damage; 
epilepsy; psychopathy; 
schizophrenia; frontal 
leucotomy; Huntingdon‟s; 
Tourette‟s Syndrome 
 (Wimmer et al., 1983) 
 (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985)  
 
                                                     
5
 As measured from Literature Review. 
6
 Significance levels for discriminant validity are quoted for the original study and „Also‟ refers to clinical groups in other studies. 
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study. 
Hinting Task 
(Corcoran et 
al., 1995)  
Schizophrenia: 
55  
Controls:  
 Normal 30  
 Mental health 
14 
 IQ 
X 6 X    Initial Study: (t=4.2; 97 df; 
p<.0001) 
 Also: autism, bipolar; 
schizophrenia. 
X 
Reading the 
Mind in the 
Eyes (Baron-
Cohen et al., 
1997; Baron-
Cohen et al., 
2001) 
1997: 
Autism: 16 
Controls: 50 & 
10 
2001: 
Autism: 15 
Controls: 203 & 
14  
 IQ 
 
n/a 22 n/a  > 50% 
selecte
d 
target; 
< 25% 
selecte
d foil 
(n=225
). 
? gender (approaching 
significance: p=.067) 
 Initial 2001 study: 
(F(3,250)=17.9,p=.0001) 
 Also: Alzheimer‟s; anorexia; 
ASPD; autism; brain injury; 
dementia; depression; sex 
offenders; schitzotypy; 
schizophrenia; Williams 
Syndrome 
 (Happe, 1994) 
Bell Lysaker 
Emotion 
Recognition 
Test (Bell et 
al., 1997)  
Schizophrenia: 
50 
Substance: 25 
Control: 81 
X age, gender, 
IQ 
r=.76 
@ 
5mths 
2  K=.93  Initial study: impairment on –ve 
affect recognition 
     (F=137.02;df=2,154;p<.0001) 
 Also: schizophrenia, substance 
misuse. 
X 
Picture 
Sequencing 
Story-telling 
task (Langdon 
et al., 1997) 
Schizophrenia: 
20 
Control: 20 
 Age, gender.       
X   IQ 
X 5 X X  Initial study: < false belief 
stories, adjusted for covariates 
(F=5.6;df=1,36;p=.023)  
 Also: alexithymia; 
schizophrenia 
X 
Picture Stories 
Inference 
Intention Task 
Schizophrenia: 
24 
Controls:  
 Mental health 
X 4  28/30  Initial study: Across 3 groups 
(F=5.2; df2,54; p<.009) and 
with Schiz sub-gp with thought 
& speech impairment (p<.0006) 
X 
17 
 
(Sarfati et al., 
1997)  
12 
 Normal 24 
 Age, gender, 
IQ,  
 Also: brain Injury; 
schizophrenia 
Emotional 
Intelligence 
(Schutte et al., 
1998)  
 IQ r=.78 
@ 2w 
3  α=.90  Non-clinical: therapists > 
prisoners (p<.0125) and 
substance misuse (p<.035) 
 Female > Male (p<.001) 
 Openness to experience: r=.54 
 Clinical: BPD; mood disorder; 
substance misuse 
 Toronto Alexythmia Scale 
(p<.0001) 
 Trait Meta mood scale 
(p<.0001) 
Faux Pas 
(Stone et al., 
1998)  
Brain lesion (left 
lateral frontal 
cortex): 5 
Controls:  
 Other lesion 5 
 Normal 5  
X 15    Initial study: (t=2.8, p<.02)  
 Also: Alzheimer‟s; ASPD; 
autism; brain damage; 
dementia; epilepsy; 
schizophrenia 
Shown to find impairment 
where less demanding tests 
did not: 
 1
st
 order (Wimmer et al., 
1983) 
 2
nd
 order (Baron-Cohen, 
1995) 
Cartoon Task 
(Happe et al., 
1999)  
Rt hem 
dementia: 14 
Control: 19 
 Age, gender, 
IQ 
 
X 7 87%   Initial study: 
(F(1,31)=38.5,p=.000) 
 Also: anorexia; bipolar disorder; 
brain injury; epilepsy; 
Huntingdon‟s; schizophrenia 
 (Happe, 1994) 
MSC EIT 
(Mayer et al., 
2003)  
2,000 Split-
half: 
r=.90 
12 r=.98 Full: r=.93 
to .91 
Branch: 
r=.76 to 
.91 
Task: 
r=.55 to 
.88 
 Personality and wellbeing 
measures 
 Predicts social deviance 
 Clinical: alexythmia; BPD; brain 
injury: HIV; depression, 
substance misuse; 
schizophrenia; schizotypy; sex 
offenders; social anxiety. 
 Understanding emotions 
branch correlates with IQ. 
?     Factor structure is different  
       between schiz and normal  
      samples (Eack, Pogue-
Geile, Greeno, & Keshavan, 
2009) 
Awkward 
Moments Test 
(Heavey et al., 
Autism: 16 
Control: 15 
 IQ, verbal, 
X 1 r=.99   Autism:  
Accuracy = (F(1,27)=18.3,p<.001) 
Response time = n/s 
 (Happe, 1994) 
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2000)  
Sarcasm Task 
(Channon et 
al., 2005)  
CHI: 19 
Control: 19 
 Age, IQ,  
X 1   Detail 
p127 
 Head Injury: 
(F(1,36)=23,p=.0001) 
 Mentalizing action 
comprehension task 
Movie for 
Assessing 
Social 
Cognition 
(Dziobek et al., 
2006)  
Autism: 19 
Control: 20 
 Age, gender, 
IQ 
r=.97 5 97% A=.84  Initial: (Mann-Whitney: 
U=9.5,p<.001) 
 Also: bipolar, depression, 
stress, BPD (in press) 
 (Happe, 1994) 
 (Ekman et al., 1976) 
 high ROC v other 
measures 
Cambridge 
Face-Voice 
Battery (Golan 
et al., 2006)  
Autism: 21 
Control: 17 
 Age, IQ, 
socio-ec, 
gender 
X 1   Across 
all 
areas 
 Autism:  
Overall: (F(1,31)=25.32,p<.001) 
Faces: (F(1,31)=15.61,p<.001) 
Vocal: (F(1,31)=21.26,p<.001) 
 Gender: F>M (p<.05) 
 
 (Baron-Cohen et al., 
2001) (p<.001) 
 (Rutherford, Baron-
Cohen, & Wheelwright, 
2002) 
(p<.001) 
Yoni Cartoon 
Eye gaze 
inference task 
(Shamay-
Tsoory et al., 
2007)  
Schizophrenia: 
24 
Brain lesion: 43 
Control: 28 
 Age, verbal 
IQ 
X   gender 
X 2    Initial: 
Perspective taking: (p<.05) 
Basic emotions: n/s 
 Autism  
 (Davis, 1983a) 
 (Ekman et al., 1976) 
 
Perspectives 
Task 
(Dumontheil et 
al., 2010)  
5 groups (Mean 
age): 
I) 35 (8.9) 
II) 36 (10.6) 
III) 35 (12.7) 
IV) 35 (15.3) 
V) 36 (22.8) 
 gender, age, 
IQ. 
X X n/a  exp  
errors> 
control 
F(1,172)=6
84,p<.001 
 Director 
errors > 
non-D 
F(1,172)=5
 Accuracy changed with age 
(F(4,172)=9,p<.001) 
 RTs changed with age 
(F(4,137)=5,p=.002) 
X 
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 executive 
functions of 
inhibition, ego 
function, 
motor 
coordination. 
 
53,p<.001 
 Director 
response 
times (RT) 
> No-D RT 
F(1,137)=3
8,p<.001 
 Control 
RTs<Exp 
RTs 
F(1,137)=9, 
p=.004 
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The critical analysis elaborating on Table 3 follows the various modes 
categorised in Table 2 above.  
 
5.1 Verbal Tasks 
Administering tasks verbally tends to be straightforward, cost-effective and is 
appropriate for adult populations. The Strange Stories task (Happe, 1994) was the 
earliest found that explicitly aimed to be a more demanding test.  It assesses 
cognitive understanding of mental states through story comprehension, likely to be 
at the level of a normal 8-9 year-old, and has been widely used.  Strange Stories 
shows that the approach can be naturalistic as it comprised of short vignettes of 
everyday situations where people say things they do not literally mean. It requires 
participants to demonstrate understanding of this with descriptive answers of mental 
states referring to thoughts, feelings, desires and dispositions. Happe‟s original 
experiment showed discriminant validity between the experimental autistic group 
and all three controls (young normal, adult normal and „mental handicap‟: p<.0001). 
External validity was positive through consistency with previous child orientated ToM 
tests. The test has been widely replicated showing discriminatory power between a 
variety of clinical groups and control conditions (16 are referenced in Appendix A1).  
However, the study illustrates the difficulties of psychometrically sound 
verbal measures. IQ is a potential confound in verbally-based studies as, without 
this factor being controlled, a difference in IQ might explain performance variations 
better than ToM deficits. The study also identifies the potential confusion of ToM 
with „central coherence‟, a broader capacity to extract meaning from information by 
understanding the context within which it is presented (Frith, 1989).  Central 
coherence and the related concept of executive function, which refers to broader 
abilities to direct attention, comprehend and integrate information, are sometimes 
presented as alternative explanations of impaired performance. There is ongoing 
debate, for example, Frith and Happe (1994) argue for the separateness of ToM and 
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executive function whilst others (Jarrold, Butler, Cottington, & Jimenez, 2000) 
suggest that they are inextricably linked. 
The relative strengths and weaknesses of open-ended versus closed 
questions are highlighted. Random error from rater reliability is a risk in open-ended 
answer formats, although this measure later achieved 85% inter-rater reliability 
(Happe et al., 1999). Happe suggests open-ended questions have an advantage 
over multiple choice formats as the latter emphasise salient features and are 
therefore leading for participants. However, some rater training would be required 
for effective administration and scoring.   
The Strange Stories task does not control for variations in memory and 
comprehension amongst participants. Frith and Corcoran (1996) found that some of 
the more demanding tasks had to be removed as they co-varied with this a 
comprehension control item. Although they still found between group differences 
(p<.01), this lowered the ceiling for more able populations. Verbal tests risk 
measuring other verbal intelligences unless they are matched for information 
content across the mentalizing and control conditions.  
There is a trade-off between tasks that include a wide range of skills testing 
the breadth of mentalization and the need for internal consistency. Whilst the 
Strange Stories task explores a wide range of mental states such as lying and 
persuasion, only 25% of the items showed good discriminative power. This suggests 
low internal consistency across the mental state measures. On the other hand, the 
Hinting Task focuses more narrowly on the understanding of social inference in 
direct speech (Corcoran et al., 1995). Its weakness is becoming less representative 
of real world demands and only exploring a limited dimension of mentalization. Even 
when the internal consistency is stronger, the construct validity may be weak: the 
Hinting Task was unable to attribute differences in performance to mentalizing as 
opposed to poorer episodic memory linked to more limited social experience.  In 
contrast with Strange Stories, the Hinting Task did include a control question to 
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ensure encoding of the information so as to rule out the explanation of impairments 
being due to working memory difficulties.  
Stone‟s Faux Pas Task (1998) is a developmentally advanced measure 
recognising that effective mentalization involves a wide range of capabilities. 
Participants are read a story and are assessed for identifying and understanding a 
faux pas; ability normally achieved at the age of 9-11. As predicted the measure 
showed significant differences (p<.02) between a group with orbito-frontal cortex 
damage (OFC) and control groups based on their known difficulties with social 
cognition. The measure has robust design features that confront possible confounds 
and separate various mentalization processes. There are control questions on non-
mentalistic inferencing and „true belief‟ tasks and minimising memory load. Whilst 
the OFC group were as good as the controls in empathic understanding, they 
seemed to be impaired in integrating inferences (ToM) with understanding that the 
person might be upset (EI). Although it was based on a small sample, this measure 
has been widely replicated (15 studies; Appendix A1).  
Similar to the judgement required for faux pas, sarcasm is a complex 
communication processing non-literal meanings. Both comprise everyday social 
challenges for adults. The Comprehension of Sarcasm Test (Channon et al., 2005) 
found a significant main effect of people with closed head injury, which is associated 
with difficulties in social communication, compared with a control group (p<.0001). 
The task adds to this analysis by being presented alongside other tests to tease out 
alternative explanations, for example, a measure of social knowledge. The results 
also showed that the open-ended verbal answers picked up subtle differences that 
closed formats did not: whilst the fact of a non-literal meaning was usually picked up 
by the experimental group, it was only the descriptive answer that showed they did 
not necessarily understand why. Even with this careful design, the researchers still 
acknowledge that, whilst there is a relationship between sarcasm comprehension 
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and mentalizing, there may be other routes to this impairment, such as poor 
executive skills.  
The lack of evidence to support reliability in individual studies found here is 
partially mitigated by Hughes et al (2000) review of early simple false belief ToM 
tests. Test-retest reliability for individual test scores was in the fair to moderate 
range (mean kappa coefficient = 0.517) and high for aggregate test scores (r=.76). 
Internal consistency was measured by firstly, finding that scores across the tests 
were highly correlated (r(46)=.7) and, secondly, creating an aggregated 9-item scale 
which strongly indicated a single construct (r=.85). This is a helpful review but 
cannot be generalised with confidence as the tests examined here are more 
complex.  
In sum, verbally-based tests can be problematic in distinguishing between 
mentalization and other language-based abilities such as memory, comprehension 
and executive functioning. Valid tests need to be able to demonstrate that these 
other factors are neutralised and, more broadly, that the task is not just a measure 
of intelligence. There are also trade-offs: between measures that seek to assess the 
breadth of mentalization and internal consistency; and between the more time-
consuming marking of open-ended answers and non-descriptive answers that may 
miss more subtle differences in performance.  
 
5.2  Pictorial Tasks  
The problems with verbal tests, particularly their correlation with IQ, may be 
overcome by presenting pictorial stimuli as the basis for assessing the ability to 
„read‟ mental states. The earliest of the identified measures, the widely used 60 
Faces Test (Ekman et al., 1976) assesses the ability to perceive and recognise 
basic emotions, which is the first tier of Mayer et al‟s model of EI (2003). The 
                                                     
7
 In this context the kappa statistic assesses whether performance on a task is more consistent across 
the re-test interval than would be expected by chance. 
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„Pictures of Facial Affect‟ feature six basic emotions (happiness, sadness, disgust, 
fear, surprise and anger) and elicited at least 70% agreement across observers and 
a further panel of judges. A previous study by Ekman and Friesen (1971) had 
demonstrated agreement across 11 literate and 1 pre-literate culture on the 
identification of emotions from posed facial expressions. The development of 
objective scoring systems (Facial Affect Scoring Technique - Ekman, Friesen, & 
Tomkins, 1972; Facial Action Coding System - Sayette, Cohn, Wertz, Perrott, & 
Parrott, 2001) further supports their validity. These systems have shown that the 
„eyes‟ area of the face is most reliable for correctly judging emotion with 73% 
success compared with 88% for the face as a whole (Ekman et al., 1972).  
The extensive research base of the 60 Faces Test has been a starting point 
for subsequent mentalization tests and the adoption of materials particularly based 
on the eyes. This measure has been consistently replicated for assessing 
differences in the ability to detect emotion, for example, a study of autism to 
ascertain if their difficulty was not only inattention to the eyes, but also impairments 
in reading their mental states (Kleinman, Marciano, & Ault, 2001). The test has also 
been used to externally validate other facial emotion measures. The test has a 
limited application for adult groups as the six basic emotions do not pick up more 
nuanced differences in emotional recognition.  
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001) is a more demanding measure that remains quick and easy to 
administer. The task asks participants to put themselves into the mind of the other 
person and „read‟ their mental states from the eyes. The initial version was 
substantially amended to eradicate psychometric weaknesses and increase its 
discriminatory performance. Increasing the forced choice from two to four responses 
and the number of items from 25 to 36 enhanced the statistical power of the test. 
The task was made more suitable for able adults by only including emotions that 
involved the attribution of a belief or intention and by having all of the foil words as 
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the same valency as the answer rather than being the semantic opposite.  The 
possible confound of comprehension problems was negated by providing a glossary 
of definitions to be available when participants were trying to map a word to a 
picture. 
This revised version replicated the between-group results of the original with 
much larger control groups (p=.0001) and this review found replication in 22 studies. 
The construct validity appears strong. Firstly, it assesses the recognition of both 
affect and cognition. For example, it only partially mirrored a straightforward facial 
emotion task (60 Faces Test; Ekman et al., 1976), and it converged with Happe‟s 
Strange Stories (1994). However, the control group was at ceiling on the Strange 
Stories task, which may limit this conclusion. Secondly, the study design enabled 
possible alternative explanations of facial perception, emotional insight, social 
understanding, IQ or executive function to be discounted. This is one of the few 
mentalization tasks to demonstrate no correlation with IQ.  
However, the assertion that the test is not affected by executive functioning 
ability remains controversial. Jarrold, Butler, Cottington, & Jimenez (2000) 
concluded that ToM relies on executive functioning and cannot be distinguished 
from it when they found an association between the early Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes Task (1997) and a test of executive functioning for adults (Embedded Figures 
Test; Witkin, Oltman, Raskin, & Karp, 1971). Both tests require the ability to 
integrate visual information by paying attention to the self and the other and relating 
to certain concepts. On the other hand, the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task has 
been contrasted with false belief tasks as it only requires an understanding of how 
others are thinking about the world, whilst the latter also demands the identification 
of the content of these attitudes. There has been inconsistent correlation between 
the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task and ToM tests, although, one review 
suggested that they do have in common the requirement to correctly appraise 
intentions and feelings (de Achaval et al., 2010). 
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The foregoing debate about what is being measured and the lack of 
consistency found between different types of measures probably attests to the 
breadth of the mentalization construct; it should not be surprising that tests do not 
have convergent validity as they may be assessing different aspects of the same 
construct. The added value of the pictorial measures is their focus on external 
explicit aspects of mental states, especially emotion. Importantly, they rely less on 
verbal comprehension and reduce or eliminate correlations with IQ. 
 
5.3  Pictorial-Verbal Tasks  
Pictorial-verbal measures raise the possibility of combining the strengths of 
pictures with verbal stimuli, reducing reliance on verbal elements and introducing 
explicit facial and body information. Langdon‟s introduction of the Picture 
Sequencing Story-telling Task (1997) attempts to link the test to the underlying 
processes of mentalization. The different stories allow for controls of non-
mentalizing, general conceptual reasoning and attention and assess four types of 
ToM – pretence, unrealised goal, intention and false belief. The results were 
interpreted as distinguishing performance on the false belief pictures from a more 
general cognitive or executive functioning deficit. This measure adds to the 
mentalization literature by suggesting that it is not a unitary construct, instead there 
are at least two mechanisms: a general sequencing process that enables the 
manipulation of symbolic representations; and the facility to critically evaluate cause 
and effect.  
However, the ambition and careful design of the Picture Sequencing Story-
telling Task still lacks clarity about what skills are needed for successful completion. 
For example, it does not take account of variation in the ability to read facial and 
body language, nor does it control for differences in language competence and task 
difficulty. A widely used measure that does recognise these confounds is the 
Cartoon Task (Happe et al., 1999). The design balanced relative difficulty across: 
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mentalistic and non-mentalistic demands; pictures with and without facial 
expressions; verbal and non-verbal; humourous and non-humourous. Participants 
are marked for their description of why cartoons are funny (87% inter-rater 
reliability). The study showed significant predicted mentalizing impairments both 
within and between groups (p=.000). The design of the measure enabled the 
conclusion that this was not due to the general task difficulty, differences in 
recognising emotion or processing facial information. The integration of visual 
information was the same in both conditions. Furthermore, the different conditions 
facilitated the dissociation of ToM ability from executive function.  
Another verbal-visual measure, the Picture Stories Inference Intention Task 
(Sarfati et al., 1997), is presented as it combines a number of design challenges. On 
the face of it, the experiment found significant impairments in the ability of people 
with schizophrenia to attribute mental states as compared with control groups 
(p<.009) and an even greater difficulty amongst the sub-group with thought and 
language problems (p<.0006). However, all of the items tested understanding of 
mental states with no comparison of the ability to infer from physical relationships, 
so, the impairment cannot be confidently attributed to difficulties in inferring mental 
states rather than something else. Furthermore, the study refers to the known 
association of schizophrenia with dysfunctional action planning and, therefore, an 
alternative interpretation would be a deficit in executive function rather than ToM.  
Along with many ToM measures, as there was a significant correlation of task 
performance and IQ in all groups, it is not possible to conclude that ToM explains 
differences in successful performance. Certain aspects of ToM may be attributed to 
gender differences, particularly a reading of emotion (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and 
one of the control groups had significantly more women. Whilst the overall size of 
the experimental group (24) was reasonable, the four symptom-based sub-groups 
averaged 6 each, which is too small to be meaningful. In fact, there were no 
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differences between these groups which left the largest explanatory factor being 
impaired communication. 
An example of the importance of measures being formulated against an 
established model of mentalization is the widely-used Mayer Salovey and Caruso EI 
Test (MSCEIT) (2003). All the tasks contained in the measure are positively 
correlated with the four branches of EI set out in the theory (see p7 for overview of 
model). For example, there are picture emotional recognition tasks for the first ability 
of perceiving emotions and tests of emotional management and relationships at the 
highest level. Good standards of reliability were found at task (r=.55 to .88), branch 
(r=.76 to .91) and full test level (r=.93 to .91). The measure was rigorously validated 
in pilot studies with over 2,000 participants and an independent expert group 
(International Society of Research in Emotions ICC: r=.98).  
The MSCEIT was developed for able adult populations and, although it has 
been widely used amongst non-psychiatric populations (12 studies, Appendix 1), it 
has mixed results. For example, in schizophrenia, Eack et al (2010) found that a 2 
factor structure of EI representing emotional knowledge and regulation appeared to 
best describe people with schizophrenia. This makes comparisons with normative 
populations characterised by the 4 factor model problematic. In relation to external 
validity, the MSCEIT has shown minimal relationships with self-report EI tests that 
are also based on the Mayer model (Brackett & Mayer, 2003). This may not be a 
problem with the model, instead showing how ability and self-report measures 
provide different information on the same person. Another overview of measures of 
EI found that the MSCEIT did correlate as predicted with self-report measures of 
alexythymia, emotional coping and metamood skills (Lumley et al., 2005).  
The final verbal-visual ToM measure reviewed, the Yoni Cartoon Eye Gaze 
Inference Task (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007), shows how the validity of a measure 
can be diminished when the results are inconsistent with the theory or do not 
converge with other similar tests. This measure used a range of verbal and non-
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verbal cues and examined impairments of cognitive and affective mental states. The 
measure picked up significant perspective taking cognitive deficits in people with 
schizophrenia and brain damage as compared with the controls (p<.05). This 
relationship converged with the perspective taking element of the Interpersonal 
Reactive Index (Davis, 1983a). However, all patients had better performance on the 
affective condition, which is contrary to their hypothesis suggesting people with 
fronto-limbic disturbances have difficulties reading emotions. Other studies have 
shown difficulties in emotional intelligence amongst people with schizophrenia (e.g., 
Eack, Hogarty, Greenwald, Hogarty, & Keshavan, 2007; Lo et al., 2010). There are 
other reservations about the test: the brain lesion patients were divided into small 
sub-groups of 7-11 people, which reduced the statistical power of the analysis; there 
is no mention of the gender balance of the groups, which could be a confounding 
variable in the analysis.  
Combining verbal and pictorial cues in a task enables a more realistic 
measure as people use more senses to mentalize. The presentation of mental 
states can be more sophisticated, which enables more demanding tests to be 
constructed. However, this greater complexity means that more mental processes 
are at work and more controls are needed to be confident about what is being 
measured. These measures also show the benefit of starting with a theory of 
mentalizing. In terms of design, the lessons emphasise the need to control for 
gender and IQ and to ensure sufficient numbers and homogeneity in the groups to 
be tested.  
  
5.4  Audio-Visual Tasks  
The measures reviewed so far have been static, but everyday mentalizing 
requires a subtle appreciation of movements in expression. Film-based tests have 
been developed to achieve this ecological validity approximating more closely to the 
real world. The Bell Lysaker Emotion Recognition Test (BLERT) (1997) builds on the 
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Faces Test by presenting the six emotions with the use of voice and a broader body 
language including movement of the upper body as well as the face. The study 
showed people with schizophrenia have poorer affect recognition than people with 
substance misuse problems or undergraduates (p<.009). The test produced more 
robust results than the Faces Test and the authors suggest this is due to the multi-
channel communications enabling „normals‟ to score more highly. The test design 
ruled out other explanations such as verbal learning ability, memory or general 
intelligence. The test also demonstrated good reliability (test-retest - R=.76 at 5 
months; consistency - K=.93). The lack of matched samples is a limitation with the 
experimental group comprising of male veterans in their forties, probably a chronic 
sub-group, and the control group being younger and more female. Bell et al do not 
provide details of any external validation and, when used alongside the Hinting Task 
(Corcoran et al., 1995), only the latter showed between group differences. This may 
reflect the latter being a ToM test as distinct from an EI task, which again 
emphasises the breadth of the mentalization concept. 
The content of the BLERT is monologues about work situations. A more 
naturalistic approach is the Awkward Moments Test (Heavey et al., 2000), which 
shows social interactions between characters and asks participants to infer their 
thoughts and feelings. The study demonstrated significant group differences on the 
mental state questions (p<.001). There was some external convergence with 
Happe‟s Strange Stories (1994), although this association did not reach significance 
for the experimental group (correct answers: r=.48). This may have been because 
the two tests require different cognitive strategies and the sample was relatively 
small (N=16). It cannot be concluded whether the test is a measure of ToM or 
executive function as it makes demands on the holding and integration of social 
information.  The scoring included both multiple choice and a mini interview about 
the intentions of characters; both showed group differences, with the latter being 
more sensitive in differentiating the groups (Correct answers: M=5.97 v 4.54; 
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Intention questions: M=22.6 v 8.31). However, the open-ended intention questions 
needed more verbal skills and this might have linked to the finding that the control 
performance was mediated by verbal IQ (p<.01). So, again, the question arises as 
to whether differences in ToM or IQ or executive function are being found.  
These concerns are recognised in the development of the Movie for 
Assessing Social Cognition (MASC) (Dziobek et al., 2006), which aims to 
approximate a real life situation whilst minimising the distracting stimuli that require 
the retention and integration of information. This instrument focuses on specific 
social cognitions, including sarcasm, faux pas, false beliefs and metaphor, rather 
than a general ability to determine the inferences of others. The assessment covers 
thoughts, emotions and intentions that require a reading of verbal (literal and 
figurative) and non-verbal (facial and body) communications. In its development, 
external validity was assessed by including other mentalization measures – Strange 
Stories (Happe, 1994), Reading the Mind in the Eyes (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) 
and Emotion Recognition (Ekman et al., 1976), as well as separate measures of 
attention, memory and executive function.  
Of the four mentalization measures, the MASC showed the largest between 
group differences. A calculation of the relative value of the four measures (Recovery 
Operating Characteristic Curve) showed that the MASC (0.98) was able to make a 
better group distinction than the others (0.65 to 0.86). The researchers explicitly built 
on the critique of the Awkward Moments Task and minimised executive function 
demands by questions being phrased simply and coming directly after an action 
sequence. This appears to have been successful: the MASC did not correlate with 
the measures of executive function, memory, attention or visual processing. There 
were no between group differences on the control questions as there had been on 
the Awkward Moments Test, which indicated the two conditions were equally 
challenging. As predicted from previous studies, the Strange Stories correlated with 
the vocabulary test (p<.05). However, there was no association of the MASC and 
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IQ. The MASC seemed to be the broadest of the mentalization measures as the 
only correlations were of the MASC and the Strange Stories in the autistic group 
(p<.05) and with the Emotion Recognition task in the control group (p<.01). The 
MASC was extensively validated in this study and reliability was also demonstrated 
(internal consistency, A=.84; test-retest ICC=.97).  The possible limitations identified 
were that the movie characters were of a similar age to each other and the study 
participants; there may be language and cultural confounds across a more mixed 
age study. 
The Cambridge Face-Voice Battery (Golan et al., 2006) also aims for a 
naturalistic test that more closely mimics real situations. However, conceptually it is 
better appreciated as a development of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and the Reading the Mind in the Voice Test (Rutherford 
et al., 2002), with which there are strong correlations (r=.74, p<.01 and  r=.62, 
p<.001 respectively). It measures performance in relation to a moving picture of 
facial emotion and a vocal-based emotion based on a well-researched taxonomy of 
412 unique emotions with developmental levels (Baron-Cohen et al., 2004). This 
made it possible to focus the task on adult populations by only including emotions 
that are normally understood by a 15-year old or above. The test distinguished 
between groups in a predicted way across all measures – overall recognition of 
emotions, facial recognition, vocal recognition and concept recognition (p<.001) - 
with all showing high power calculations (0.999 at α=.01). As predicted, and 
consistent with similar tests, there was a main effect of gender on the facial scale 
with females outperforming males (p<.05). Interestingly, women found it easier to 
mentalize from faces and men from voices (p<.05); the authors suggested the latter 
might be due to males using the vocal content to compensate for face recognition 
difficulties. There was no correlation with age or IQ and, given the minimal demands 
on memory and understanding of context, it is suggested that the test measures 
mentalization independently of executive function. 
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A rather different audio-visual ToM test of mentalization specifically designed 
for adults is the Perspectives Task (Dumontheil et al., 2010). Bateman and Fonagy 
(2004) suggest that successful mentalization requires inhibitory control of the natural 
egocentric bias, particularly as it relates to impulsiveness.  This was tested out by 
requiring practical decision-making whilst having to take account of another person‟s 
perspective. In a large sample (N=176), the Perspectives Task showed significant 
improvements in the ability to take the perspective of others beyond adolescence 
into adulthood compared with the control condition (p<.001). Even the adults 
performed the experimental condition well below ceiling. The two conditions were 
matched for executive function capabilities so that it was clear the improvement 
beyond adolescence seemed to be entirely in perspective taking. The task appears 
to have robust internal controls but lacks any external validity check, making the 
construct validity debatable. The task seems to include two mentalizing abilities, 
those of taking another‟s perspective and of inhibiting the egocentric bias, without 
being clear what their contribution and interaction is for the task. 
These audio-visual tasks show that it is possible to develop naturalistic 
measures with strong psychometric properties and relevance to normal adult 
populations. The tests are more demanding and discriminate across able groups 
without a ceiling effect. However, whilst the good design of controls can increase 
confidence that one is observing variation in mentalization, the complexity of the 
processes involved means straightforward interpretation is not possible. In 
particular, the contribution of executive function – the ability to hold and integrate 
information – is required for these tests and is difficult to separate from 
mentalization. 
 
5.5 Self-Report and Rating Measures 
The measures so far have been ability-based, externally assessing the 
performance of a task against a „correct‟ answer. In contrast, self-report measures 
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rely on the participant to rate themselves against criteria, usually with closed 
question for ease of marking and administration. A rating measure is an assessment 
of the attributes of others by 3rd party raters. 
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (Davis, 1983a) is a 28 item self-
report empathy questionnaire with four subscales encompassing dimensions of 
mentalization. Firstly, perspective taking is described as the fundamental social 
ability of entertaining the mind of another, an essentially cognitive quality. Secondly, 
empathic concern relates to responsivity to others. Thirdly, personal distress 
assesses feelings about the self in challenging situations. Fourthly, fantasy is the 
tendency to imagine oneself in place of characters in books or films. These 
constructs can also be understood as a developmental transition: from self-focussed 
emotional reactions to a more other-orientated perspective.  
The IRI has been validated in large samples (N=1,500), albeit of psychology 
students and shown robust reliability (ICC - r=.71 to .77; test-retest - r=.62 to .71). 
The affective and cognitive sub-scales had convergent validity with similar 
measures. There were significant gender differences as predicted (p<.05). 
Hypotheses regarding the relationship of the different sub-scales with other 
measures were validated, for example, Perspective Taking was related to social 
functioning (p<.05) and self-esteem (p<.05) as well as having less emotionality. In 
another study, Perspective Taking and Empathic Concern were shown to differ as 
predicted in relation to emotion reactions, the former being unrelated and the latter 
being positively correlated (p<.01) (Davis, 1983b). The task is helpful in covering 
many of the conceptual aspects of mentalization. Although it has been successfully 
used in clinical studies, it was not developed or tested with clinical populations. It is 
short and practical in research settings.  
Another self-report measure is the 33 item Self-Report Emotional Intelligence 
Scale (SREIS) (Schutte et al., 1998). This aims to cover the whole EI model but is 
also criticised for being unclear as to what it actually measures. Despite having 
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robust reliability, it is not significantly related to the MSCEIT which applies the same 
model and theory of EI (Brackett et al., 2003). This could be a problem with the 
model but, given the widespread research into the Mayer model, it is more likely to 
indicate how ability and self-report measures provide different information on the 
same person. People tend to be poor self reporters and there is an acknowledged 
susceptibility of self-reports to being manipulated. Furthermore, many self-report 
scales use a more mixed model by combining mental abilities and self reported 
qualities.  
The Reflective-Self Function Scale (Fonagy et al., 1991) is the only example 
found of 3rd party rating of attributes, in this case, a parent‟s capacity for internally 
observing and understanding the behaviour of themselves and others. It is a 9-point 
scale assessed by independent rating of Adult Attachment Interviews (AAI)  (Main & 
Goldwyn, 1991). The scale runs from: (1) the parent showing minimal appreciation 
of the motives of others in determining their behaviours; to (9), the parent 
demonstrating an organised and consistent understanding of others. The scale aims 
to predict and understand the impact of the parent‟s mentalization on the emotional 
and cognitive development of their child.  
The scale was applied to 200 parents and showed discriminatory validity. It 
was able to predict: AAI classifications for mothers at twelve months (r=.7 to 1.0); 
the child‟s security of attachment as measured in the Strange Situation (Ainsworth, 
Wall, Waters, & Blehar, 1978) (75% predictive rate); dimensions within the AAI, for 
example, parental ability to observe their own mental functioning, which relates to 
secure children (r=.51 for mothers); and, observer ratings of child behaviours in the 
Strange Situation (r=.37 for avoidant behaviour). This longitudinal predictive strength 
contrasts favourably with standard questionnaire personality measures. It also had 
reasonable inter-rater reliability (r=.7 for the mother interviews) and was 
independent of demographic variables, personality measures and verbal 
intelligence. Whilst the scale can assess understanding of the self and others, it 
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does not discriminate between the inclination to reflect and the accuracy of that 
ability. In the review, there are no replication studies to confirm its utility. This may 
be due to its narrow application and being resource intensive as a research tool.  
This section highlights the contribution of rating scales to measure 
mentalization. Self-report scales are relatively easy to administer, but they rely on 
the person having the insight and inclination to respond accurately. There is a lack 
of convergence between some self-report and performance measures that purport 
to assess the same construct. This may be because they are measuring different 
aspects of mentalization or that they vary in reliability. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
This review aimed to find if a psychometrically robust mentalization measure 
was available for use with adults and had the strength to discriminate amongst 
normal populations. Following a search incorporating the terms mentalization, ToM 
and EI, 19 measures of adult mentalization were identified. The majority of these 
focussed on either ToM or EI and none assessed all of the mentalization domains, 
that is: cognitive and affective insight; reflection on the self and others; and, making 
judgements from both explicit information and a sense of internal mental states. The 
processes underlying these domains are insufficiently precise and too broad to 
successfully operationalise. Given this reservation, this review can set out the critical 
points in developing an optimal approach to measuring mentalization.  
The review found that the tests provided good discriminant validity. They 
distinguished clinical from normal populations, based on theory, and usually 
achieved high significance levels with quite modest sample sizes. However, these 
clinical groups had quite significant mentalization impairments and for measures to 
be able to differentiate amongst normal populations, minimal ceiling effects are 
required and this was unclear from most studies. Where the measures were able to 
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discriminate between groups, it was not always clear to what extent this was due to 
differences in mentalization.  
Construct validity was widely recognised as a challenge.  The variety of 
measures purporting to assess ToM recognises the complexity of trying to delineate 
different thinking and feeling processes and separate these from other factors that 
may be contributing to impairment. For example, it is not clear to what extent 
mentalization difficulties may actually be attributed to differences in social 
experiences, attention, inferential reasoning skills, memory and verbal aptitudes. 
The more demand placed on verbal skills, the more IQ becomes a confounding 
factor and needs to be controlled by balancing of groups. The creators of the 
MSCEIT accept that a confound with verbal ability is inevitable and a correlation of 
about 0.4 is to be expected between EI and verbal ability as they both tap 
intelligence (Lumley et al., 2005). However, most of the above factors can be 
controlled by good design and recruitment procedures. A more difficult issue of 
construct validity was whether mentalization could be distinguished from executive 
function.  
There are different views as to the separateness of ToM and executive 
function. Performance on many of the mentalization tests correlates with verbal 
skills, which suggests some sort of verbal scaffolding is required. A study by Bull et 
al (2008) in healthy functioning adults found that an association between ToM and 
executive function depended on the measure chosen as different methods placed 
different demands on executive function. Stories tasks were found to make high 
demands on executive functions, particularly attentional resources – this suggests 
the need for a non-mental state control. Pictorial tasks made relatively low demands 
on executive functioning. These findings and further research in this area will help 
design and interpret appropriate studies. 
Just as construct validity was often unclear, external validity also showed 
discrepancies as to what was being measured.  There are mixed and inconsistent 
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results when mentalization measures are compared. This may reflect the breadth of 
the mentalization construct or it not being a unitary construct. However, any single 
test is likely to miss important aspects of mentalization. The solution is either to have 
a battery of complementary tests designed to cover different aspects of mentalizing, 
or, to operationalise and validate a specific domain. 
In relation to measures being consistently reproducible, few of the studies 
present a comprehensive analysis of reliability. The Hughes et al (2000) review of 
reliability showed that their results were most robust for aggregate scores across 
tests; looking at an aggregate index of internal consistency, alphas never dropped 
below .80. This suggests that improved reliability can be gained by administering 
multiple measures.  
As a test of social cognition, it is essential that results can be generalised to 
the real world. Ecological validity and whether competence predicted performance in 
the real social world was unclear. Most measures tended towards concrete 
questions. However, in real life, mentalizing takes place in a complex environment, 
problems are not well-defined and responses tend to be more dimensional. Perhaps 
not surprisingly, open-ended questions were often better at finding differences. 
There is a tension between achieving naturalistic contexts and also retaining a 
simple account of the mentalization construct being applied and its administration. 
However, some of the film-based measures showed that naturalistic measures could 
be combined with psychometrically robust design. 
A number of tentative conclusions can be drawn from this review. There is 
no single valid and reliable measure of mentalization. The breadth of the construct 
makes the development of such a test unlikely. However, with a clear theory-led 
hypothesis, an experiment might be constructed with measures closely aligned and 
meeting the following criteria. Firstly, tests should have well developed controls for 
executive functioning and verbal ability. Secondly, samples need to be matched to 
minimise contamination from variables such as IQ and gender. Thirdly, there is a 
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case for developing a battery of measures so there is a range covering different 
aspects of mentalization, depending on the hypothesis. Fourthly, the tests should 
include naturalistic settings, which, as far as possible are relevant to the population 
being studied. Fifthly, these should have minimal context so as to prevent 
confounding variables being introduced. Where the study is considering adults that 
are functioning at a high level, it is essential that any ceiling effect is minimal. 
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Part 2: Empirical Paper 
 
 
Are difficulties in mentalizing associated with severity of  
Antisocial Personality Disorder? 
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Abstract 
 
Aims 
The aims were to examine mentalization in people with Antisocial Personality 
Disorder (ASPD) and contribute to improved risk assessment and treatment.  
 
Method 
Eighty-two male offenders on community license, recruited from probation 
services in London, completed a battery of computerised mentalizing tests. The 
population included a significant proportion meeting the threshold for ASPD 
 
Results 
The group were impaired at mentalizing on some of the tasks compared with 
control group performance in published studies. In line with the hypothesis, three of 
the mentalization sub-scales were able to modestly predict the severity of ASPD: the 
Perspectives task, the MASC absence of mentalization sub-scale and the Mind in 
the Eyes task.  
 
Conclusions 
The deficits in mentalizing ability in ASPD are subtle. There are lessons to 
be learnt in the development of mentalization measures and the assessment of 
ASPD, which have implications for both the NHS and the Criminal Justice System. 
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1. Introduction  
           There is little evidence for the effective treatment of people with Antisocial 
Personality Disorder (ASPD) (NICE, 2009). This study aimed to explore possible 
mentalization deficits in people with ASPD, so as to support research into the 
development of clinical interventions. The study investigated a community sample of 
offenders where a significant prevalence of ASPD was expected. This group was 
also selected for their relevance to current public policy aiming to find alternatives to 
prison (Ministry of Justice, 2010), in particular, for those with mental health 
difficulties (Bradley Report, 2009; Ministry of Justice, 2010).  
ASPD is categorised as a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of 
the rights of others, present since the age of 15, and accompanied by at least 3 
specified characteristics, for example, antisocial behaviour, deceitfulness, impulsivity 
and a lack of remorse (American Psychiatric Association, 2000)8. The disorder is 
also termed psychopathy, sociopathy or dissocial personality. This diversity of labels 
reflects a broad definition that may contain a range of presentations. In an analysis 
of forensic populations, Hare (1991) identified  two psychometric factors within the 
construct of psychopathy: affective and interpersonal traits such as callousness and 
deceit; and, impulsive and antisocial aspects. Hare‟s analysis not only recognises 
the antisocial manifestation but also points to emotional dysregulation in 
relationships and the exploitative nature of people with ASPD. This interpersonal 
and emotional orientation, combined with the typical behaviours of ASPD, sets out a 
possible framework for the potential benefits of psychological therapy.  
There are a number of overlapping models seeking to explain anti-social and 
violent behaviour in psychopathy. The low fear hypothesis (Lykken, 1995) is based 
on a diminished capacity for emotion. The Response Modulation model (Patterson & 
Newman, 1993) points to attentional deficiences in processing emotional 
                                                     
8
 Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (Revised 4th ed.) (DSM). 
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information. In his impaired violence inhibition model, Blair (2001) suggests a 
disorder of emotional empathy based on a defective amygdala and reduced 
recognition of fear. These theories point to certain neural pathways to explain the 
basis for antisocial behaviour. The amygdala is important for the emotional content 
of memories and for learning on the basis of reward or punishment (Ward, 2006); 
the detection of fearful stimuli is essential for this and regarded as particularly 
impaired in these theories. Shamay-Tsoory et al (2010) implicate the orbitofrontal 
cortex as the main neural area explaining antisocial tendencies. They suggest that 
the difficulty lies in the abilty to integrate emotional and mindreading processes for 
which the orbitofrontal cortex‟s executive functioning, including attention, 
comprehension and the integration of information, is crucial. Blair (2005) expanded 
his model by proposing an Integrated Emotions System (IES). This placed impaired 
amygdala functioning at the root of psychopathic characteristics and an impaired 
orbitofrontal cortex as partly explaining impulsive and aggressive behaviour.  
All of these models of ASPD point to disruption in recognising or responding 
to other‟s emotional states and some also highlight possible cognitive impairments. 
Another model that brings together emotional and cognitive aspects is mentalization, 
which emerged from thinking about people with Borderline Personality Disorder 
(BPD) and was broadened out to include ASPD (Bateman & Fonagy, 2008). 
Mentalization is the way people make sense of their social world by imagining their 
own and others‟ mental states, including beliefs, intentions, emotions and 
motivations (Fonagy, 1991). It describes a complex understanding of oneself and 
others, which requires a stable sense of self as well as interpersonal abilities. 
Mentalization as presented by Fonagy (1991) derives from developmental 
thinking that recognises the vitality of attachment relationships whereby the 
caregiver‟s reflective position stimulates the growth of mentalizing capacity in the 
child. In a secure attachment (Bowlby, 1977), the carer models emotional regulation 
as well as helping to mirror the baby‟s feelings, thereby aiding the experience and 
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comprehension of emotions. This process provides experience of understanding 
one‟s own mind and the existence of another mind (Fonagy, Steele, Steele, Moran, 
& Higgitt, 1991). Conversely, a disorganised attachment history makes certain 
people vulnerable to mentalization deficits and certain social situations add risk to 
the antisocial expression of that impaired interpersonal understanding.  Crucially in 
the Bateman and Fonagy model (2008), this impaired mentalization is triggered as a 
temporary retreat to the coping mechanism used during the original development of 
attachment; usually, shutting oneself off from considering the other person‟s mind. It 
is hypothesised that this brief loss of the ability to mentalize is triggered by current 
threat to the self. 
A strength of the mentalization model is that it includes difficulties that people 
with ASPD have in relation to others as well as a diminished sense of self-worth. 
This fragile sense of self is at the root of complementary theories of antisocial and 
violent behaviours. For example, it has been suggested that feelings of 
worthlessness may be activated by feelings of shame, leading to a sense of 
humiliation that can only be dealt with by the violent humiliation of others (Gilligan, 
1996; Stuewig & Tangney, 2007). The mentalization model may also be contrasted 
with the previous group of ideas that tend towards an explanation that assert a 
biological impairment. Whilst the mentalization model can also be described in terms 
of neural pathways, it places this in the context of the plasticity of the brain, the 
influence of social and environmental risks and indicates a possible role for 
psychosocial interventions. 
Research into people with ASPD has been inconsistent with only a few 
patterns emerging. The main measures applied have been for Theory of Mind (ToM) 
or Emotional Intelligence (EI), although umbrella descriptions such as social 
cognition or mentalizing are also used. ToM is the abilty to understand and predict 
one‟s own and other‟s attributions and intentions (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). 
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Emotional Intelligence refers to the expression, understanding and regulation of 
emotion (Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 1999).   
Tests of ToM have not indicated a purely cognitive impairment in people with 
ASPD to identify intentions, states of mind or the fact someone else may believe 
something that is in fact untrue (false belief tasks) (Richell et al., 2003; Blair, 2005). 
On the other hand, some evidence has been found relating to the mispercepton of 
others (Widom, 1976) and to subtle impairments in a higher level (faux pas) ToM 
task (Dolan & Fullam, 2004). „Faux pas‟ tasks require empathic understanding as 
well as cognitive appreciation of the difference between the listener‟s and the 
speaker‟s knowledge. Shamay-Tsoorey and colleagues (2010) found impairments in 
„affective ToM‟ but not in „cognitive‟ ToM, the difference being that the former 
required participants to think about affect. Studies with child and adolescent 
conduct-disordered populations have been mixed, two studies showed impairment 
in hard to manage preschoolers (Happe & Frith, 1996; Hughes, Dunn, & White, 
1998) and others found no differences (Sutton, Smith, & Swettenham, 1999; Sutton, 
Reeves, & Keogh, 2000).  
The results of facial emotion EI tests have also been inconsistent but have 
tended towards an impairment in recognising specific negative affects. For example, 
deficits have been found in recognising sad faces (Hastings, Tangney, & Stuewig, 
2008; Dolan & Fullam, 2006; Blair, Colledge, Murray, & Mitchell, 2001), fearful faces 
(Blair et al., 2001; Montagne et al., 2005) and expressions of anger and disgust 
(Jones, Forster, & Skuse, 2007). Other studies have also found impairments in the 
recognition of emotion (e.g. Dolan et al., 2004). However, other studies have found 
no impairments (Glass & Newman, 2006). Interestingly, a method which 
differentiated types of psychopaths found that callous and unemotional traits were 
positively correlated with accuracy of perception of fearful faces and positive 
emotion, and negatively associated with negative emotion, while impulsive and 
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antisocial traits were not related to emotional recognition or positive emotion, but 
positively associated with negative emotion (Del Gaizo & Falkenbach, 2008). 
Self-report EI questionnaires have also revealed differences within the 
psychopathy dimension.  The callous unemotional sub-type gave less attention to 
affective information, whilst the impulsive antisocial type had difficulty inhibiting 
emotions (Malterer, Glass, & Newman, 2008). Another self report method showed 
differences between low and high anxiety psychopaths with the latter showing a 
deficit in EI (Vidal, Skeem, & Camp, 2010) 
There are several important conclusions from this research in respect of the 
current study. Firstly, regarding the various models, there is some support for a 
deficit in the recognition of fear and possibly some other negative affects, in line with 
the amygdala or reward-based theories. Criminality or antisocial personality may be 
associated with a deficit in the recognition of aversive cues in others. Although, this 
has also been conceptualised as a deficit in non-verbal emotional processing 
(Shamay-Tsoory, Harari, Aharon-Peretz, & Levkovitz, 2010). There seems to be 
some impairment in the more sophisticated ToM/EI ability to integrate emotional and 
mindreading processes.  
Secondly, most of the research has concentrated on samples of serious 
offenders in prison who meet the Hare Psychopathy Checklist (1991). People who 
meet ASPD criteria but who are not in this „psychopath‟ sub-type have been poorly 
researched. An exception was the Dolan & Fullam study (2004) which discriminated 
between psychopathic and non-psychopathic sub-groups of ASPD and found that 
only the latter were impaired in their recognition of basic emotions. This study 
suggests that important differences may have been lost at a general diagnostic level 
or by too great an emphasis on the callous unemotional low anxiety (Psychopath) 
group.  
Thirdly, there is a lack of clarity with what the various research tasks are 
measuring. At the more demanding level, it is hard to distinguish between a ToM 
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and an EI task as the abilities seem to need to work together. Constructs such as 
ToM, EI and empathy are complex and the underlying processes are not fully 
understood. Blair distinguishes emotional empathy and cognitive empathy, with the 
latter being akin to ToM (2005). It may be that in areas of sophisticated social 
functioning, the conceptual separation of emotional processing in the limbic system 
and the frontal lobe‟s higher level cognitive networks is unhelpful. In examining 
higher order ToM tests, Stone et al (1998) suggest that ToM inferences require 
emotional understanding; while “hot” aspects of ToM require the amygdala and the 
orbito-frontal cortex for people to appreciate others‟ actions and intentions. Fourthly, 
and arising from the last point, differences that do exist will only be identified by 
tests that are relatively demanding and are appropriate for an able population.  
Fifthly, some of the studies suggest that the apparent inconsistency in test 
results at the level of the psychopath construct may be hiding other differences. For 
example, there is some evidence that there are differences between those: with high 
or low anxiety levels; or, those who are impulsive versus those who are more 
detached and controlled. These factors may explain differences in mentalization 
performance. 
   Arising from this review of the research, the study was designed to examine 
relative mentalization capabilities in a community sample of offenders with varying 
degrees of ASPD. Mentalization was deemed the most appropriate measure as its 
breadth is a strength when it comes to examining abilities to „read‟ the minds of 
oneself and others. ToM and EI emphasise the cognitive and affective components 
as being more separate than is helpful. The assessment needs to be able to 
consider the two in harmony – the ability to “think and feel about thinking and 
feeling” (Allen, Fonagy, & Bateman, 2008). In recognition of the need to integrate 
these cognitive and affective aspects, mentalization was adopted as a way of 
conceptualising and assessing differences in this study. However, the disadvantage 
is that there is no current valid single assessment tool for mentalization (Choi-Kain & 
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Gunderson, 2008). A variety of tests were selected for their validity in assessing 
differences across able populations and covering the basic dimensions of 
mentalization (Allen et al., 2008) (for detail, see the literature review for this thesis). 
This includes the ability to: (a) „read‟ others minds and body language as to their 
intentions; (b) take a perspective on oneself in relation to others; and, (c) 
comprehend both affective and cognitive aspects of oneself and others. 
In summary, there are inconclusive results and remaining questions around 
the ability of people with ASPD to mentalize. By concentrating on the psychopathic 
groups, research has largely involved those who are unemotional and callous, 
missing those who are more disinhibited, impulsive and perhaps higher in anxiety. It 
might be formulated that this latter ASPD sub-group are more susceptible to the 
risks of transitory mentalization impairments as described by Bateman and Fonagy 
(2008). They may be more amenable to treatment and further investigation in this 
area would therefore have clinical application, particularly with such interventions as 
Mentalization Based Therapy, Dialectical Behavioural Therapy and Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy. In the area of personality disorder, these treatments have 
demonstrated improvement in people with BPD. Indeed, Paris (1997) has 
conjectured that BPD and an emotional variant of ASPD are the same disorder; the 
former particularly applied to women and the latter to men.  This strengthens the 
justification for research into how these therapies might help with ASPD. 
This study assessed mentalization impairments in a community sample of 
offenders. The principle hypothesis was that the greater the degree of ASPD, the 
greater would be the mentalization impairment as measured across a battery of 
computerised tests. A second prediction was that, when  applying a variable „stress‟ 
condition („shame in relation to others‟) aimed at triggering emotional arousal, 
mentalization difficulties would become even greater. 
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2. Method 
2.1 Design 
This was a correlational study using a cross-sectional design. Participants 
completed a series of self-report questionnaires and computerised tasks. 
2.2 Participants 
Eighty-two male participants, aged between 18 and 72 years, under license 
conditions following a convicted offence were recruited from local probation services 
in West and NW London. Assessment took place in 5 locations: Probation Office A 
(n=20); Probation Office B (n=31); Hostel C (n=18); Hostel D (n=5); and, Day Centre 
E (n=8).  
2.3 Procedure 
The NW London Research Ethics Committee 2 approved the study 
(Appendix B1). Participants were recruited via Offender Managers making referrals 
from their caseload. They were requested to refer a cross-section of their clients, 
excluding people with a known learning disability or current severe mental health 
problem. A self-report screening form was used to identify other characteristics 
being controlled for, including severe head injury and current use of psychotropic 
medication. Written informed consent was obtained from all participants (Appendix 
B2). A battery of measures and tests was completed via individual appointments in 
an interview room in the local London Probation Trust premises.  
This battery comprised the following measures: 
a) Personality:  the Antisocial Personality Questionnaire (APQ; Blackburn & Fawcett, 
1999 ); the Personality Assessment Inventory for ASPD and Borderline Personality 
Disorder (PAI; Morey, 1991).  
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b)  Mental Health: Brief Symptom Inventory for Axis I disorders (BSI; Derogatis & 
Melisaratos, 1983) was administered to ensure anyone with a current severe mental 
health problem was excluded.  
c) IQ: the Wechsler Test of Adult Reading was administered as a proxy measure of 
intellectual function.  
d) Mentalization: The Perspectives Task (Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010) 
was always first. For a random 50% of the sample, this was followed by a stress 
condition (Goss, Gilbert, & Allan, 1994), and then everyone went on to the next step. 
The order of the remaining two mentalization tasks was random and balanced; 
either, the Movie for Assessing Social Cognition (Dziobek et al., 2006) followed by 
the Mind in the Eyes (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001) or the 
reverse. This was to avoid possible „order‟ effects between these two tests due to 
exhaustion or frustration. 
All these tasks were completed in a single session of about 2 hours duration 
excepting one person who attended on two different days. Participants received £10 
plus travel expenses for their time.  
2.4 Measures of Personality, Mental Health and Intellectual Functioning. 
a) Antisocial Personality Questionnaire (APQ) (Blackburn et al., 1999) . 
Antisocial Personality was assessed using this 125 item multi-trait self-report 
inventory which measures cognitive, affective and behavioural dispositions of 
relevance to offender and antisocial populations. The measure provides 8 basic 
scales (self-control, self-esteem, avoidant, paranoid suspicion, resentment, 
aggressive, deviance, extraversion) and 2 factor scores (impulsivity, withdrawal), for 
which the reliability (Cronbach‟s alpha) ranges from 0.77 to 0.87 suggesting 
satisfactory internal consistency. The scales differentiate the mentally disordered 
offender and normal groups (p < 0.001).  
The measure provides a raw score and a T-score for each scale. For the 
purpose of analysis, this instrument provided the following measures: 
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i) APQ ASPD: Three of the scales (Resentment, Aggression and Deviance) 
can be grouped to measure antisocial personality disorder with their validity 
confirmed through correlation with the MCMI-1 antisocial personality 
category items: resentment (.37), aggression (.41) and social deviance (.21). 
This measure of ASPD was created in line with the manual by aggregating 
the three factors. This summed value provided a Cronbach‟s Alpha of .874 
and the analysis showed that if any of the three factors were taken away, this 
value would reduce. 
ii) APQ ASPD Group: The 2 factor scales can be combined into 4 profile 
patterns of antisocial personality: (a) primary psychopath – highly 
extraverted, dominant, aggressive, impulsive, mistrusting, showing deviant 
behaviour and untroubled by anxiety; (b) secondary – different form the 
primary group by being socially anxious, submissive lacking in self-esteem 
and very vigilant to threat; (c) controlled – overcontrolled, extraverted, self-
accepting and denying mistrust or suspicion; (d) inhibited – similar to 
controlled except being introverted, withdrawn and reporting social deviance. 
b) Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI) (Morey, 1991). 
The PAI measure contains ASPD and BPD subscales. The antisocial 
component taps into three facets of the syndrome. Antisocial Behaviours 
corresponds to conduct problems that characterise the DSM definition of the ASPD. 
Egocentricity includes the self-centredness and narcissism often thought to lie at the 
core of the psychopathic disorder. Stimulus-Seeking involves a tendency to seek 
thrills and excitement and low boredom tolerance.  
The borderline sub-scale covers four elements. Affective Instability describes 
rapid and extreme mood swings. Identity Problems refers to having little sense of 
purpose, typically including a feeling of emptiness. Negative Relationships  includes 
a history of ambivalent, intense or unstable relationships, often accompanied by 
feelings of resentment or betrayal. Self-harm describes people who are impulsive in 
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areas where negative  consequences are likely such as sex or substance misuse 
and high scorers report increased risk of self-mutilation or suicide. 
  Studies have shown these subscales to be reliable and valid (Morey, 1991). 
In terms of external validity, the antisocial sub-scale correlates with the Hare Self-
Report Psychopathy Scale (.82) and both the antisocial and borderline scales 
correlate with the respective MMPI scales (antisocial: .60; borderline: .77)9. The raw 
score is converted into a T-score, which is intepreted as follows: Antisocial scale: (a) 
60-69T: somewhat impulsive and a risk-taker, increasingly self-centred, sceptical 
and unsympathetic to others in interpersonal relationships towards the upper end; 
(b) above 70T: likely to be impulsive and hostile, to have a history of antisocial acts 
and to be seen by others as beng exploitative in relationships; (c) above 82T: 
prominent features of ASPD. 
c) London Probation Trust Offender Assessment System (LPT OASys): ASPD 
dataset. 
The LPT OASys contains a 9 item ASPD dataset derived from professional 
assessment of offender behaviour and history to assist in risk management. The 
dataset is comprised of: number of court appearances before the age of 18; use of 
violence or coercion; excessive use of violence; recognition of the impact on the 
victim; over-reliance on family for financial support; manipulative or predatory 
lifestyle; recklessness or risktaking behaviour; childhood behavioural problems; 
impulsivity; and, aggressive or controlling behaviour. This rating provided a 
behavioural measure of ASPD as an externally rated alternative to the self-report 
questionnaires. The following measures were used in this analysis: 
i) The LPT use definitions of: (a) Low ASPD, where less than 5 of the above 
items are scored; (b) Moderate ASPD, where 5-6 items are scored; and (c) 
Severe ASPD where 7+ items are scored. 
                                                     
9
 All validity correlations for PAI with College Student  samples. 
72 
 
ii) For the purposes of this analysis, a LPT ASPD Behaviour measure was 
created in two stages. Firstly, the 9 items were converted where necessary 
so they were all binary scores. This 9-item dataset had a Cronbach‟s Alpha 
of .59, which was improved by extracting 3 factors (recognition of impact, 
court appearances before the age of 18 and excessive violence) leaving a 
more reliable set of 6 factors10 (Cronbach‟s Alpha = .68). Next, these items 
were used to create a dichotomous variable with a low ASPD group (n=39) 
and a high ASPD group (n=43). This became the behavioural measure of 
ASPD (LPT ASPD Behaviour). 
d) Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI) (Derogatis et al., 1983). 
The BSI is a 53 item self-report symptom inventory, which identifies the 
status of psychological symptoms over the last seven days. Nine factors of mental 
health are measured by the BSI and a Global Severity Index score, Positive 
symptom total score, and Positive Symptom Distress Index score (all expressed as 
T-scores). Internal consistency coefficient alphas for the nine symptom dimensions 
range from .71 for Psychoticism, to .85 for Depression. The test-retest reliability 
coefficient is .91 for the Global Severity Index over a 2-week period. The BSI is also 
normed on four gendered groups, including adult psychiatric inpatients, adult 
psychiatric outpatients and adult non-patients, therefore providing suitable norms for 
the participants in the current study. 
e) Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (WTAR, Wechsler, 2001). 
This reading test is composed of a list of 50 words that have atypical 
grapheme to phoneme translations and was used to assess participant‟s level of 
verbal intellectual functioning. Unlike many intellectual and memory abilities, reading 
recognition is relatively stable in the presence of cognitive declines associated with 
normal aging or brain injury. It is normed with the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 
                                                     
10
 6 item OASys dataset used to form behavioural measure of ASPD: offence involving threat or 
violence; over-reliance on others for financial support; manipulative or predatatory lifestyle; 
reckless/risk taking behaviour; impulsivity; aggressive or controlling behaviour. 
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(WAIS-III). It has excellent internal consistency with Pearson correlation coefficients 
ranging from 0.87 to 0.95 for the UK sample. The test-retest coefficients indicate a 
high degree of temporal stability in a range (0.90 to 0.94) consistent with the internal 
consistency coefficients. The raw score (0-50) can be converted to an estimated 
verbal IQ, (depending on age: mean IQ=100, sd=15). 
Mentalization Tasks 
f)The Perspective Taking Test (Dumontheil et al., 2010). 
This computer simulated task was written in E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology 
Software Tools, Inc.) and presented on a laptop. Participants are read instructions 
(Appendix B3) and are presented with a 4x4 set of shelves with 8 of the 
compartments containing a different object and receive an auditory instruction to 
move an object using the computer mouse (see Figure 1 below).  
Figure 1 
Illustration of Perspectives Task 
                   (a) Experimental trial                 (b) Control trial 
 
               
 
Figure 1  Example of an Experimental (a) and a Control trial (b) in the Director condition. 
The participant heard the verbal instruction: “Move the large cup up” from the director. In the 
experimental trial, if the participant ignored the director‟s perspective, he would choose the 
distractor cup (large mug), which is the largest cup on the shelves but which cannot be seen 
by the director, instead of the smaller cup shared by both the participant‟s and the director‟s 
perspective (Target). In the Control trial (b), the irrelevant object (screwdriver) replaces the 
distractor item. 
 
Move the 
large cup 
up 
 
Distractor
Target 
Irrelevant 
object 
Move the 
large cup 
up 
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In the Director condition, 5 of the compartments are closed at the back and 
could not be seen by the director who stands behind the shelves and gives the 
instructions. Participants were told to take into account what the director could see 
when deciding how to respond. Sixteen shelf-object configurations were shown 
sequentially, each with 3 instructions. Of the 48 trials: 8 were experimental trials 
where the participant was tested in their ability to take the perspective of the director 
into account rather than moving the „distractor‟ object which was invisible to the 
director and would have reflected an egocentric bias; 8 were control trials with an 
identical shelf arrangement but with an irrelevant „distractor‟ object; the other 32 
were fillers. In the No-Director condition, participants were told that the director had 
gone and they would hear instructions to move objects again and that these only 
referred to the objects in the clear slots and to ignore objects in those with grey 
backgrounds. Other than this it was identical to the Director condition in terms of the 
number of trials, how they were counterbalanced and the mix of experimental, 
control and fillers. Each stimulus lasted 2.2 seconds and participants had 3.6 
seconds to respond. They were told to respond as quickly and accurately as 
possible. Each condition lasted 5.5 minutes. Participants are measured for their 
accuracy and their speed (where they are accurate) in a repeated measures design 
by condition (Director/No-Director) and trial type (Experimental/Control). 
This task requires participants to use information about the Director‟s 
perspective in order to interpret instructions and respond appropriately by inhibiting 
their egocentric bias. Both conditions require a mixture of executive functions. In 
addition, the Director condition also requires level-1 perspective taking, the ability to 
represent what another person can see. This ability is a core component of internal 
mentalizing since, to predict and explain another person‟s behaviour, people make 
inferences about their knowledge or beliefs on the basis of their visual access.  
The measure has shown to be sensitive to differences in performance 
between the conditions (p<.001) and the trial types (p<.001) across different age 
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groups (p<.001). It is sufficiently challenging for adults with no floor or ceiling effects 
found in previous studies with normal populations. 
The outcome measures for this instrument are: (a) Director condition 
experimental errors (%); (b) Director condition control errors (%); (c) No-Director 
condition experimental errors (%); (d) No-Director condition control errors (%); (e) 
Director condition experimental response time (milliseconds) (RTms); (f) Director 
condition control RTms; (g) No-Director condition experimental RTms; and, (h) No-
Director condition control RTms. 
g) The Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC; Dziobek et al., 
2006). 
The MASC was administered by the researcher who controlled the laptop 
presentation of the test‟s slides and video clips put together on Microsoft 
Powerpoint. The testing starts with a slide instruction that the participant is going to 
watch a 15 minute film and he should try to understand what the characters are 
feeling and thinking. The tester navigates through several slides containing 
instructions and then through the entire test using the mouse or space bar. As part 
of the first slides, the four characters are introduced in the form of photographs and 
names. After that, participants are instructed that the film shows these four people 
getting together for a Saturday evening and that the movie will be stopped at various 
points and questions will be asked. Participants are informed that the film has been 
dubbed and told to try to imagine what the characters are thinking or feeling at the 
very moment the film is stopped. 
Following the instructions, the 43 video segments are presented, each 
followed by a question in the same format followed by four possible answers (see 
Figure 2 below). Participants are instructed to tick the answer they think is closest to 
their understanding on a multiple choice answer sheet. Administration of the MASC 
took between 25 and 40 minutes as participants were not put under a time 
constraint. The video is paused 43 times and 45 questions are asked concerning the 
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characters‟ intentions (19), feelings (18), and thoughts (8), plus 6 control questions 
where no mentalization is required.  
Figure 2 
Multiple Choice Format in the MASC. 
      
Figure 2 presents an example of a multiple choice question in the MASC. Michael has just 
said to Betty (photo inset on answer slide): “I bet if it was left to you, you’d go for 5 cups of 
cream, right?” (Sandra has just said that the recipe requires 2 cups). Unknown to the 
participant, the four possible answers represent different degrees of mentalization: (a) 
excessive mentalization; (b) no mentalization; (c) correct answer; (d) insufficient 
mentalization. 
 
The design includes traditional mentalization concepts such as first and 
second order false belief, deception, faux pas, persuasion, metaphor, sarcasm, or 
irony. As well as the different mental state modalities categorised above, the 
emotional valence (3 positive, 13 negative and 2 neutral) varies and approximates 
the frequency distributions previously considered by others (Ekman & Friesen, 
1976). The items varied as to their conversational content, specifically, being either 
verbal or non-verbal; with the verbal items to be taken literally or not literally (those 
containing figurative speech and other aspects of pragmatics) and the non-verbal 
category providing items to assess the recognition of facial expressions, as well as 
general body language and gestures. Single items could cover more than one 
domain. The control questions are for memory, general comprehension and 
attention. 
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In previous studies the MASC test has proved to be sensitive to social 
impairments in psychiatric populations such as Autism (Dziobek et al., 2006), 
Bipolar disorder (Montag et al., 2010), Depression (Wilbertz, Brakemeier, Zobel, 
Harter, & Schramm, 2010) and BPD (Sharp et al., 2011). The test has good indices 
of reliability (Cronbach's alpha .84, test–retest reliability .97). However, the 
interpretation of varying patterns of intercorrelations with other ToM tests remains 
unclear.  
The MASC test has strong face validity and was used in this study to assess 
affective and cognitive aspects of mentalization. The multiple choice format provides 
a correct mentalization score (0-45) with sub-divisions of feelings (0-18), intentions 
(0-19) and thoughts (0-8); correct control responses (0-5); and three different types 
of mistakes that reflect (a) mental state inferences that are „„insufficient‟‟ (0-45) and 
(b) „„too excessive‟‟ (0-45) and (c) a non-mental state inferences (i.e., physical 
causation) (0-45). All of these raw scores were transformed into a percentage for 
analysis.  
 
h) Reading the Mind in the Eyes, Revised Version (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).  
This test involves presenting participants with a series of 36 photographs of 
the eye region of the face of different actors using a Powerpoint show on a laptop. 
An equal number of male and female faces were used. Four complex mental states 
descriptors were typed at each corner of the photograph. One of these words 
correctly identified the mental state and the other three foils were of the same 
emotional valence as the target word. Participants are instructed to read all four 
words and choose one of the four words that best described what the person in the 
photo is thinking or feeling and tick their choice on a multiple choice answer sheet. A 
glossary of all the terms used in the test was provided for reference and participants 
were able to work through the test at their own pace. As a control for facial 
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recognition and attention, participants were also asked to identify the gender of the 
person in each photograph (M or F).  
 
Figure 3 
Mind in the Eyes Examples. 
                 
Figure 3 displays 2 of the 36 questions, illustrating the presentation and multiple choice 
question format. In these examples, the answers are: (6) fantasising/female; (7) 
uneasy/male. 
 
This 10 minute test is widely used in research and has successfully 
differentiated mentalization impairments in a number of clinical populations including 
Autism (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), Schizophrenia (Schimansky, David, Rossler, & 
Haker, 2010), brain injury (Stone, Baron-Cohen, Calder, Keane, & Young, 2003) and 
sex offenders (Elsegood & Duff, 2010). In the original study, a one-way ANOVA 
comparing the 4 groups on the revised Mind in the Eyes task revealed a significant 
main effect of group, F(3,250) = 17.87, p = 0.0001. The answers have been 
subjected to a consistency check so that the target word was identified at least 50% 
of the time and the foil word no more that 25% of the time. The test does not show 
floor or ceiling effects. In this study, the measure was used to assess the external 
dimension of mentalization and both cognitive and affective impairments.  
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i) Arousal Condition: Other as Shamer Scale (OAS; Goss et al., 1994). 
A „shame arousal‟ condition was randomly administered to 50% of 
participants. In this condition, the participant completed the OAS, a 17 item 
questionnaire exploring expectations of how others see or judge the self. It has three 
factors: Factor I relates to being seen as „inferior‟ (7 items). Factor 2 relates to what 
might be called „emptiness‟ (4 items). Factor 3 consists of items which ask “how 
others behave when they see me make mistakes” (6 items). The scale was 
developed as the „external‟ version of the Internalised Shame Scale (ISS; Cook, 
1988). A significant correlation was found between the ISS and the OAS (r = 0.81). 
The study supported the view that shame involves self-evaluations (“I am ...“) and 
beliefs about how others see the self (“They see me as ...”). It has been shown that 
how one sees others as judging the self is highly related to self judgments; in other 
words, self and other‟s judgments of self are highly correlated (Goss et al., 1994).  
The researcher administered this task by saying: “most people feel a level of 
embarassment, self-consciousness or shame at some time...could you think about 
your life over the last 12 months and then hold those thoughts in mind as you 
answer the following questions”. When the questionnaire was completed, the 
participant would be asked how they were feeling. This protocol was tested in a pilot 
and found to increase self-reported anxiety on a Likert-type scale (t(6)=-
2.83,p=.03)11.  
2.5 Other Sources of Data 
As well as the ASPD dataset, the LPT OASys provided demographic data 
(date of birth, ethnicity) and a tiered rating of risk to the public12: Tier 1 – low risk of 
harm; Tier 2 – medium to low risk; Tier 3 medium to high risk; and, Tier 4 – very high 
and high risk. 
                                                     
11
 Paired samples t test. 
12
 Tiering as defined in London Probation Tiering Guidance is based on PC08/2008 “National Rules 
for Tiering Cases and Associated Guidance”. “Tiering is about the level and type of intervention that 
will be deployed in managing a case.  As such it is principally, but not exclusively, guided by the 
sentence imposed by the court as well as the level of risk and offender need/complexity of the case.” 
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2.6 Sample size and Statistical Power 
Power analysis for this study was informed by prior work by Dolan and 
Fullam (2006). In this study the Faux Pas task (Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 
1998) was used with people with ASPD, and found an effect size of d=0.89 (large). 
Assuming equal group sizes, power calculation was carried out using the “G*Power 
3” computer program (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) specifying α=5% and 
desired power = 80%. For a comparison between 2 groups, the required sample 
size was estimated at 42 (2 groups of 21). The achieved sample size was 82. 
2.7 Data Analysis 
Scores on completed questionnaires and answer sheets from the MASC and 
Mind in the Eyes Tests were manually entered in an SPSS 18.0 database together 
with information collected from OASys. The results from the Perspectives Test were 
collected automatically as part of the E-Prime programme. These were exported to 
an Excel spreadsheet and the key outcome variables calculated for each participant 
and then transferred to the SPSS database.  
To adjust for individual differences in overall task difficulty and for the 
confounding influence of strategies (e.g. rates of guessing answers), the differences 
in correct response rates for mentalizing and control items were calculated as a 
proportion of total correct scores. Adjusting for the overall likelihood of correct 
responses made no difference in two of the three mentalzing tests (MASC and Mind 
in the Eyes) but did affect scores on the Perspectives Test, probably because it 
demands considerable visio-spatial skills in addition to mentalizing competance. 
Individual differences on the former would have swamped variablity in terms of 
mentalizing without correcting for differences in this capacity. Therefore, for the 
Perspectives output measure, the fraction of the total number of accurate scores for 
each individual was used as the data point for that person13.   
                                                     
13
 The corrected Perspectives Test outcome score calculated as follows: (Director Experimental 
Errors-Director Control Errors)/(Director Experimental Errors+Director Control Errors). 
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A preliminary scan of the data confirmed the experimental impression that 
the shame condition was not sufficiently evocative to yield an effect and there were 
no differences in the performance of participants in the two conditions on any of the 
mentalization measures. Following a preliminary statistical test confirming 
homogeneity of distributional properties the groups were therefore combined into a 
single group of 82. 
The combined data were checked for normality using visual analysis of 
histograms and statistical tests of skewness and kurtosis. Parametric tests were 
used where the measure met common standards of normality. Non-parametric tests 
were only required for the more arbitrary Probation ASPD behavioural measure, 
which did not meet criteria for normal distribution. 
T-tests, correlational and regression analyses were used to test the 
hypotheses in the following steps: 
Step 1: A comparison of the sample‟s average performance on measures of 
mentalization with published results from other studies based on normal and 
offender/personality disordered samples; 
Step 2: A correlational analysis of the ASPD variables with each of the mentalization 
tests; 
Step 3: Reconsidering significant associations whilst controlling for possible 
influence from variables such as age, IQ (WTAR), mental health severity (BDI GSI), 
BPD, ethnic origin; 
Step 4: A logistic regression was used to assess the predictive value of 
mentalization performance on Probation ASPD outcome variable; 
Step 5: A multivariate backwards stepwise regression analysis was used to assess 
the predictive value of the mentalization measures in relation to the self-report 
ASPD outcome variables. 
-  
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3. Results 
3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents a demographic profile of the participants.  
Table 1 
Demographic Information (N=82) 
 
Variable Mean(s.d) Range 
Age (years)  
 
33 (10.9) 18-72 
Education (years after age 7)  
 
9.7 (2.5)  3-21 
IQ (WTAR) 
Population mean = 100 (15) 
 
91.6 (17.5) 50-123a 
Mental Health Severity Index 
(GSI)   (T-score) 
59.5 (14.6) 34-80 
 %  
Ethnicity (%)   
White 39%  
Black 31%  
Asian 21%  
Mixed 2%  
    White other 7%  
 
a  
10 participants (12%) scored 70 or less. This indicates a learning disability. However, as a 
result of reservations regarding the WTAR for this population, the Learning Disability record 
on the OASys was used for this screening. All these participants were kept in the study. 
 
Participants had a mean age of 33, ranging from 18 to 72. They had a mean 
of 10 years in education after age 7 and their mean estimated IQ (WTAR) was in the 
low average range at 91.6. The mean overall level of mental health difficulties 
reported (General Severity Index of the Brief Symptom  Inventory) was 59.5 which 
indicates a high level of mental distress (84th percentile) compared with a general 
male population (Derogatis et al., 1983). The ethnic diversity of the sample is 
consistent with that found in the boroughs where the research took place with the 
three main ethnic groups of White, Black Afro-Carribbean and Asian each 
representing between 20-40% of the sample. 
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Table 2 shows how the sample compares with the London-wide offender 
profile.  
 
Table 2 
Comparison of Sample and London Offender Profile14 
 
 This Study 
(N=81a) 
London  
(N=18,110) 
Risk Tier   
Level 1 – Low risk 0% 2% 
Level 2 – medium to low 16% 22% 
Level 3 – medium to high 42% 59% 
Level 4 – very high & high 42% 14% 
   
Use of violence/ aggression in 
crime 
  
Yes 51% 43% 
No 49% 57% 
 
a This information was not available for one of the participants. 
 
 
The sample distribution for level of risk differs significantly from the London 
Offender Profile ( 2(3)=52.3, p<0.0001). Proportionally, the sample was comprised 
of three times as many offenders assessed as being in the “high and very high” risk 
tier category compared with the London-wide picture. The sample also included a 
higher proportion of offenders convicted of a crime that included violent or 
aggressive acts although this was not significant ( 2(1)=2.12, p=0.15). The higher 
risk ratings represented by the sample are in line with the recruitment strategy which 
aimed to find offenders more likely to have ASPD characteristics.  High risk hostels 
were targetted and the briefing to Offender Mangers, who were instrumental in 
referring offenders, gave this aim (Appendix B4). 
Table 3 presents the severity and type of ASPD amongst the sample.  
 
 
                                                     
14
 Source: London Probation Trust Research Department from OASys. 
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Table 3  
ASPD Characteristics (N=82) 
 
ASPD Measure  Score (sd) 
Self-report:  
Antisocial Personality 
Questionnaire  
(Blackburn et al., 
1999) 
APQ ASPD  
(Mean T-score/sd) 
 
58.3 (9.9) 
  
ASPD Group:  
Primary 54% 
Secondary 9% 
Controlled 31% 
Inhibited 7% 
 
Self-report: 
Personality 
Assessment Inventory 
(Morey, 1991) 
PAI ASPD  
               Mean T-score/sd 
               >60 (ASPD features) 
               >70 (ASPD) 
               >82 (Prominent ASPD) 
 
65 (12.9) 
65% 
24% 
12% 
     
London Probation 
Trust -LPT  ASPD 
Behavioural measurea 
Low ASPD 
High ASPD 
48% 
52% 
 
a This is the binary measure created from the main LPT ASPD categorisation for analytical 
purposes. 
 
The two self-report measures indicate high levels of ASPD in the sample. 
The APQ mean of 58.3 compares with normative data with 50 as the mean (s.d=10). 
The PAI shows a mean score of 65 with 65% having individual scores over 60, 
which indicates features of ASPD such as being impulsive, a risk-taker, increasingly 
self-centred, sceptical and unsympathetic to others in interpersonal relationships. 
The APQ categorises types of ASPD and the two main groups found in the sample 
were primary psychopaths (highly extraverted, dominant, aggressive, impulsive, 
mistrusting with a history of deviant behaviour and conflict in relationships, who are 
relatively untroubled by anxiety of self-criticism) and controlled psychopaths 
(overcontrolled, conforming, sociable, extravert, self-accepting and denying 
interpersonal mistrust or suspicion). Both these categories are relatively outgoing 
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and low on anxiety compared with others and the main difference is that the primary 
group are more impulsive.  
As noted, a variety of measures of ASPD were used in the study and Table 4 
assesses their relationship based on Pearson‟s correlations.  
Table 4 
Correlation of ASPD Measures (N=82, unless otherwise stated) 
 
  APQ  
ASPD 
APQ  
Group 
PAI  
ASPD 
LPT  
ASPDa 
LPT  
Risk Tierb 
APQ 
ASPD 
 
Pearson‟s Corr  .629** .605** -.016 -.023 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .889 .839 
APQ 
Group 
 
Pearson‟s Corr .629**  .350** .061 .022 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .001 .583 .845 
PAI ASPD 
 
 
Pearson‟s Corr .605** .350**  .143 .022 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .001  .199 .846 
LPT 
ASPDa 
 
Pearson‟s Corr -.016 .061 .143  .452** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .889 .583 .199  .000 
LPT Risk 
Tierb 
Pearson‟s Corr -.023 .022 .022 .452**  
Sig. (2-tailed) .839 .845 .846 .000  
 
a   
This was derived from the LPT behavioural measure of ASPD and calculated for reasons 
of statistical reliability (see Data Analysis section). 
b   
N=81 as this information was not available for one of the participants. 
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) 
 
The two self-report measures (APQ and PAI) were closely correlated 
(p<.001) which is reassuring as they have both been validated against other, albeit 
different, measures of ASPD. The two measures taken from the LPT information 
system were also closely correlated (p<.001), which helps to validate the use of the 
LPT ASPD as a variable to measure ASPD. However, the self-report and 
behavioural measures do not correlate with each other. At this stage, it was 
hypothesised that they may be measuring different aspects of ASPD and, as 
performance on various mentalization measures were available, this possibility 
could be examined further. Both self-report and behavioural measures of ASPD 
were therefore retained for analysis. 
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3.2 Pre-Hypothesis Testing of Mentalization Performance 
Prior to hypothesis testing, performance in each of the mentalization tasks 
was compared with results from other studies and these are presented in Table 5-7. 
Clearly, if mentalization is to be associated with severity of ASPD, then the entire 
anti-social group in this study should score below the comparator group on this task. 
Further, the validity of the results for this sample would be strengthened if the 
instruments can be shown to behave in a similar way in the current sample as in the 
original investigations where the instruments were standardized. 
Table 5 
Mentalization Performance in the Perspectives Task Compared 
 
 This Study Other Study 
(Dumontheil et al., 2010) 
Errors:  
Director Control 8% Adultsa              2% 
Adolescentsb     3% 
 
Director Experimental 77% Adults              45% 
Adolescents     60% 
 
No Director Control 8% Adults                3% 
Adolescents       3% 
 
No Director Experimental 28% Adults                8% 
Adolescents       7% 
 
More errors in experimental 
than control condition 
 
t(81)=24.5, p<0.001 F(1,172)=684,p<.001 
More errors in the Director 
than in the No-Director 
t(81)=10.2, p<0.001 F(1,172)=553,p<.001 
 
a Adults (N=36) had a mean age of 22.8 (sd 2.3) and a verbal IQ of 119.5 (sd 15.1). 
b
 Adolescents (N=35) had a mean age of 15.3 (sd 1.2) and a verbal IQ of 114.3 (sd 18.7). 
 
Performance in the Perspectives Task was in line with the direction of the 
original study (a normal sample of females), that is, there was a tendency towards 
an egocentric bias with significantly more errors in the experimental than the control 
situation and more errors in the Director than the No-Director condition. In terms of 
the pattern of this tendency, in comparison with different age groups represented in 
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the original study, this sample had substantially more Director Experimental errors 
than the adult group and an elevated level of errors when compared to the 
adolescent group. 
Table 6 
Mentalization Performance in the MASC Compared 
 
 This Study Other Studiesa 
Correct answers  
 
Control answers 
61.4% (14.3) 
 
69% (20.7) 
75.74% (7.32) 
 
79.5% (18) 
   
 
a  Weighted mean and sd from control groups in 4 studies: (Dziobek, Fleck, Rogers, Wolf, & 
Convit, 2006, N=17; Montag et al., 2010, N=29; Smeets, Dziobek, & Wolf, 2009, N=16; 
Wilbertz et al., 2010, N=16). 
 
In the MASC, the antisocial sample made significantly more errors than the 
average of control groups in other studies (t(122)=-8.01,p<.001)15, with only 1% 
performing at the higher level of the control groups. At the same time, performance 
in the control condition was not significantly poorer.  
Table 7 
Mentalization Performance in the Mind in the Eyes Compared 
 
 This Study Other Studies    Sample (Author) 
Correct 
answers 
21.8 (5.9) 26.0 (4.2) Male Controls (N=55)a 
  26.3 (4.3) 
 
 
23.9 (5.3) 
Male Prisoners (N=18)  
(Richell et al., 2003) 
 
Psychopathic male prisoners 
(N=19) (Richell et al., 2003) 
 
  24.5 (5.8) 
 
 
21.9 (6.6) 
Male Child Sex Offenders (N=46), 
(Elsegood et al., 2010) 
  
Autism/Asperger Adults (N=15), 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) 
 
Control 
answers 
95.4% Normal adults performed at ceiling in original study. 
 
                                                     
15
 This is an independent samples t-test and using the Welch-Satterthwaite equation for the df. 
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a  This result from the original study (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) has been regularly replicated 
in a variety of control groups and analysis has demonstrated that this measure is 
independent of IQ. 
 
Performance on the Mind in the Eyes Task was significantly poorer than 
achieved by the normal control group in the original study (t(135)=-4.88,p<.001). 
Furthermore, the performance of offenders in this study was not significantly poorer 
than a general prison population or a prison psychopathic population in another 
study. This sample obtained a similar score to that achieved by high performing 
people with autism from the original study. 
 
3.3 Hypothesis Testing 
Main Hypothesis: the greater the degree of ASPD, the greater will be the 
mentalization impairment. 
A correlational analysis of mentalization performance in relation to measures 
of ASPD was carried out and is presented at Table 8.  
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Table 8 
Correlation of Mentalization Performance and Measure of ASPD 
 
  APQ 
ASPD 
APQ 
Group 
PAI 
ASPD 
LPT ASPD 
Behaviour 
LPT 
Risk 
Tier 
Perspectives Task      
Experimental   
Error Score 
(corrected
a
) 
Correlation .14 .00 .20 .35** .20* 
Sig.(2-tailed) .223 .992 .075 .001 .038 
N 81 81 81 81 80 
MASC       
Correct total Correlation .06 .01 -.27* -.05 .04 
 Sig.(2-tailed) .592 .919 .013 .640 .674 
 N 
 
82 82 82 82 81 
Feelings Correlation -.01 .09 -.22* -.03 .02 
 Sig.(2-tailed) .925 .436 .048 .761 .861 
 N 
 
82 82 82 82 81 
Cognition Correlation .11 .05 -.23* -.04 .05 
 Sig.(2-tailed) .344 .64 .04 .72 .57 
 N 
 
82 82 82 82 81 
Exceeding 
Mentalization 
Correlation .02 .05 .05 -.02 -.11 
Sig.(2-tailed) .888 .669 .690 .896 .229 
 N 
 
82 82 82 82 81 
Less  Correlation -.15 -.03 .21 .07 .00 
Mentalization Sig.(2-tailed) .172 .813 .057 .515 .961 
 N 
 
82 82 82 82 81 
No  Correlation .03 -.05 .30* .05 .06 
    Mentalization Sig.(2-tailed) .781 .661 .007 .650 .547 
 N 
 
82 82 82 82 81 
Mind in the Eyes      
MiE Correct  Correlation .01 .01 -.27* .01 .05 
 Sig.(2-tailed) .925 .963 .016 .958 .590 
 N 82 82 82 82 81 
 
Note: Pearson‟s Correlation used for all ASPD variables except LPT Risk Tier for which a 
Kendall‟s non-parametric correlation was used. 
a
 See Data Analysis section for methodology 
*  Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) 
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This table shows the correlations of measures of mentalization 
(Perspectives, MASC sub-scales and Mind in the Eyes) with ratings of ASPD. 
Strong significant correlations (p<.01) were found between performance on the 
Perspectives Task and the LPT behavioural measure of ASPD. A significant 
correlation (p<.05) was found between the Perspectives Task and the LPT Risk 
measure. Further significant correlations were found between various sub-scales of 
the MASC, the Mind in the Eyes and the PAI self-report ASPD measure. There were 
no correlations between mentalization tasks and the APQ self-report measure even 
though the latter corresponded highly with the PAI and both these measures have 
been externally validated against other similar measures of ASPD. 
It is possible that the correlations found between mentalization and ASPD 
can be explained by other variables such as age, IQ (WTAR), Severity of Mental 
Health Problems (BSI GSI), Ethnicity and BPD. Partial correlations were carried out 
whilst controlling for these variables and changes in the coefficients are summarised 
in Table 9.  
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Table 9 
Correlation of Mentalization Performance and Measure of ASPD after 
Controlling for Variables 
 
Mentalization 
measure 
ASPD measure  Controlling for variables Revised 
correlation 
(significance)  
Perspectives Task 
 
LPT Behaviour Age, IQ, Mental Health, 
Ethnicity & BPD
a 
 
.36** (p=.002) 
    
 LPT Tier Age .20 (p=.078) 
 IQ .20 (p=.072) 
  Mental Health .18 (p=.115) 
  Ethnicity .24* (p=.031) 
  BPD .20 (p=.078) 
MASC  
(Correct) 
PAI Age .24* (p=.035) 
IQ .20 (p=.075) 
 Mental Health .26* (p=.024) 
 Ethnicity .31** (p=.006) 
  BPD .26* (p=.021) 
 
MASC  
(Feelings) 
PAI Age .18 (p=.109) 
IQ .16 (p=.147) 
  Mental Health .22 (p=.059) 
  Ethnicity .23* (p=.038) 
  BPD .20 (p=.08) 
 
MASC  
(Cognition) 
PAI Age .20 (p=.08) 
IQ .15 (p=.181) 
  Mental Health .21 (p=.07) 
  Ethnicity .27 (p=.017) 
  BPD .22* (p=.049) 
 
MASC  
(No mentalization) 
PAI Age .25* (p=.026) 
IQ .23* (p=.037) 
  Mental Health .28* (p=.012) 
  Ethnicity .30* (p=.006) 
  BPD .25* (p=.025) 
Mind in the Eyes 
(Correct) 
PAI Age, IQ, Mental Health, 
Ethnicity & BPD 
 
.24* (p=.041) 
  Age .25* (p=.027) 
  IQ .20 (p=.07) 
  Mental Health .29* (p=.011) 
  Ethnicity .31** (p=.006) 
  BPD .26* (p=.018) 
 
a 
The correlations with each of these variables individually was p<.005. 
*  Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) 
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The significance of the correlation found between the Perspectives task and 
the LPT ASPD behavioural measure was changed minimally by controlling for all of 
these variables. However, the other LPT measure of Risk Tier was no longer 
statistically significantly associated with perspective taking when controlling for most 
of the variables. The relationship found between the MASC and the PAI ASPD 
reduced so that the only sub-score remaining significant when these variables were 
controlled was the MASC “No mentalization”. IQ was the most common in providing 
an alternative explanation for the relationship of ASPD severity and mentalizing.  
The MASC “No mentalization” remained significant when examined against each of 
these variables, although both age and IQ reduced the strength of the correlation. 
The Mind in the Eyes measure no longer reached significance when IQ was 
controlled. These findings were instructive in specifying the variables to include in 
the regression analyses at the next stage when unique predictors of ASPD are to be 
identified. It should be noted that in all cases controlling for possible confounding 
variables reduced but by no means eliminated the associations observed. The 
indication is that a larger sample would have yielded significant correlations in all 
cases. 
Before proceeding to a multivariate analysis of the ASPD mentalization 
association, the relationship between the mentalization measures was examined to 
ascertain if excessively high correlations between the mentalization variables could 
cause possible collinearity problems. In fact, the associations between mentalizing 
scores were modest. There was a significant relationship between the MASC “No 
mentalization” and the Mind in the Eyes measures (r=.46; p<.001), but no 
relationship between either of these and the Perspectives Task. In the light of the 
modest associations, the analysis proceeded to identifying the combination of 
mentalization variables that explained variation in ASPD once the influence of 
confounding variables was controlled. 
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Multivariate regression analyses were carried out to assess how well the 
mentalization measures in combination could predict high or low ASPD. The two 
ASPD outcome measures that had shown a relationship with mentalization (the LPT 
behavioural and the PAI self-report scores) were regressed separately. Firstly, direct 
logistic regression was performed to assess the predictive value of the mentalisation 
tasks on the severity of ASPD assessed by the LPT measure (LPT ASPD) used with 
offenders in the sample. The model contained the six independent variables (age, 
IQ, Severity of Mental Health Problems, Mind in the Eyes Correct score, MASC no 
mentalization score, Perspectives corrected error score). As shown in Table 10, two 
of the independent variables made a unique statistically significant contribution to 
the model (Mind in the Eyes Correct score and Perspectives corrected error score). 
Table 10 
Logistic Regression Predicting Likelihood of ASPDa 
 
 
       B 
 
S.E. 
 
 Wald        df 
  
p 
 
Odds 
Ratio 
 
95% C.I.for  
Odds Ratio 
Upper       Lower 
Age 
 
-.02 .03 .37  1 .541 .99 .94 1.04 
IQ 
 
-.00 .02 .03 1 .865 1.00 .96 1.03 
Severity Mental  
 Health Problems 
-.02 .02 1.07 1 .301 .98 .95 1.02 
MiE Correct 
 
.11 .06 3.83 1 .050 1.12 1.00 1.24 
MASC “no   
  mentalization” 
.05 .05 1.20 1 .273 1.06 .96 1.16 
Perspectives 
 
-4.93 1.59 9.67 1 .002 .01 .00 .16 
Constant 3.34 2.51 1.77 1 .183 28.33   
 
a. Dependent Variable: LPT ASPD Behavioural Measure. As this is a binary variable, Logistic 
Regression was used. 
 
The full model containing all the predictors was statistically significant, 
2(6,N=77)=15.382,p=.017, indicating that the model was able to distinguish 
between offenders who were categorised as having „high‟ or „low‟ ASPD as derived 
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from the LPT ASPD score at above chance level. The model as a whole explained 
between 18.1% (Cox & Snell R square) and 24.1% (Nagelkerke R squared) of the 
variance in ASPD, and correctly classified 70.1% of cases as severe or not.  
Multiple linear regression was used to assess the ability of the three 
mentalization variables to predict ASPD severity as measured by the PAI self-report 
measure whilst controlling for Severity of Mental Health Problems, Age and IQ. The 
only mentalization measure achieving significance when controlling for these other 
factors was the MASC “no mentalization” measure. The results of a three step 
regression analysis showing the contribution of these variables is presented in the 
final model at Table 11. 
Table 11   
Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for ASPDa (N=77) 
 
Final Model 
Variables
b 
     95% C.I for B 
B SE(B)  t   Sig.(p)  Lower  Upper 
 (Constant)  
 
73.64 5.13 
 
14.35 .000 63.42 83.86 
Severity of Mental    
   Health Problems 
.26 .07 .38 3.78 .000 .12 .39 
Age -.20 
 
.09 -.22 -2.19 .032 -.38 -.02 
MASC no 
mentalization 
.34 .16 .22 2.13 .037 .02 .65 
 
a. Dependent Variable: PAI ASPD Self-report 
b.
 Variables excluded from the final model: Perspectives Error score, Mind in the Eyes 
correct, IQ. 
 
Severity of Mental Health Problems was entered at Step 1, explaining 15.1% 
of the variance in reported ASPD. Age was then entered at Step 2, explaining a 
further 7% of variance. No other confounding variables remained significant. At this 
point mentalization variables were considered for entry into the model. After entry of 
the MASC “no mentalization” measure at this third step, the total variance explained 
by the final model as a whole was 26.6%, F(3,74)=8.951,p<.001. No other 
mentalization variable could be used to account for variance in ASPD.The 
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mentalization measure explained an additional 4.5% of the variance in ASPD, (R 
squared change=.045, associated F (1,74) =4.535, p=.037). Thus even after 
controlling for the possible confounding effect of younger age and more severe 
mental health problems, both of which predicted poor mentalization and higher 
ASPD scores, MASC scores remained statistically significant predictors of ASPD. 
Offender characteristics, particularly mental health problems and age, were also 
predictive of ASPD (Appendix B5 provides the detailed supporting tables). 
In summary, with reference to the main hypothesis that the greater the 
degree of ASPD, the greater would be the mentalization impairment, there are two 
significant results. Firstly, the Perspectives and the Mind in the Eyes tasks are both 
significant predictors of ASPD in offenders as measured by the LPT ASPD 
categorisation. Secondly, the best fitting model for predicting self-reported ASPD 
(PAI) comprises of the MASC sub-scale “no mentalization” (as an independent 
predictor) together with Mental Health severity and age. There was no support for 
the second hypothesis that any mentalization impairment found in people with ASPD 
would be greater for those whose anxiety was raised by a stress condition. As the 
stress condition did not succeeed in raising any of the clients‟ anxieties substantially 
this hypothesis could not be investigated 
 
4. Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to assess the mentalization capabilities of 
antisocial male offenders. It was predicted that their ability to mentalize would 
diminish as their severity (number of symptoms) of ASPD increased. The sample 
included a significant proportion of offenders with ASPD: 65% with features of ASPD 
as measured by the PAI self-report; and, 52% with moderate or severe ASPD as 
measured by the Probation behavioural scale. The group of offenders in this study 
were impaired at mentalizing compared with control group performance in other 
studies across all the measures. In line with the main hypothesis, three of the 
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mentalization sub-scales were able to predict the severity of ASPD. The strongest 
predictor of ASPD as rated by the Probation measure was the Perspectives task 
error score (p=.002), although the Mind in the Eyes task was also significant (p=.05). 
The MASC absence of mentalization sub-scale predicted ASPD as self-reported on 
the PAI (p=.037), although the model was even stronger with the addition of Mental 
Health  severity and age (p<.001).  
Whilst the predictive strength of the mentalization measures was modest, 
there are several lines of enquiry suggested by these results. Firstly, what are the 
reasons for the impaired mentalization found in this offender group? Secondly, what 
might be the reason for the relationship between ASPD and quite specific types of 
mentalizing impairment, that is, perspective-taking and non-mentalizing? Thirdly, 
what does this study contribute to the measurement and meaning of ASPD? 
Fourthly, what is the role of variables such as IQ, age and mental health in the 
findings?  
The apparently impaired mentalization amongst the offender group cannot 
be validated without a control group. It is possible that this finding is better explained 
by other group differences such as IQ or socio-economic status. However, these 
results are consistent with other studies examining forensic populations with the 
Mind in the Eyes task (Richell et al., 2003; Elsegood et al., 2010). Thus, these 
findings should be viewed with caution.  
In the absence of a recognised overall measure of mentalization, this study 
deployed a range of tasks. This is the first study using the Perspectives or MASC 
tests with this population and the relationships found between these tasks and 
ASPD are interesting in different ways.  Perspectives is cognitive in its orientation 
and therefore quite a narrow mentalization task. It requires participants to represent 
what another person can see and to use this information about their perspective 
when following instructions. In doing so, they need to inhibit their egocentric bias. 
The original study in a normal population found that performance improved with age 
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and the authors hypothesised that this might be due, not so much to an increased 
efficiency in perspective taking, but to a change with age in the propensity for people 
to take account of another person‟s perspective (Dumontheil et al., 2010). Our 
results found a close match with the adolescent group of previous studies. In the 
context of offence-related and antisocial behaviour, it may be helpful to formulate an 
element of this as linked to the delayed or absent development of a tendency to 
have regard for others‟ perspectives. The relatively young profile of this sample and 
their lack of education may be consistent with the delayed development of some 
mentalization strategies.  
An alternative explanation might be the recognised impulsiveness of people 
with ASPD. This would account for the poor performance across both test types, but 
it does not explain the difference between the control and experimental conditions, 
which are both equally susceptible to impulsive responses. Moreover, the APQ 
breakdown of ASPD group showed that the primary psychopath group, which is 
characterised by high levels of impulsiveness, was no different from the controlled 
group (low in impulsiveness). 
The MASC is a broader naturalistic test of mentalization, requiring more 
complex social judgements. The absence of mentalizing found in this study both 
adds to and contrasts with other research. People with ASPD have been found to 
have nuanced impairments in mentalization (Dolan et al., 2004) and to have 
difficulty with recognising certain emotions (Blair et al., 2001; Hastings et al., 2008). 
On the other hand, the MASC has discriminated between different types of 
mentalizing difficulties across varied psychopathologies: undermentalizing in bipolar 
disorder (Montag et al., 2010); under and hypermentalizing in depression (Wilbertz 
et al., 2010); and, hypermentalizing in BPD (Sharp et al., 2011). It raises the 
question as to how non-mentalizing might be different to not mentalizing very well. 
There are possible explanations for non-mentalizing consistent with theories 
of antisocial behaviour. An absence of mentalizing may relate to a callous disregard 
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for others that is found in the psychopath phenotype of ASPD, that is, a deliberate 
strategy or unconscious defence to ignore the mental states of others. Alternatively, 
a tendency to select non-mentalizing explanations for social actions may reflect an 
inability to consider emotional or cognitive mental states. This could be considered a 
part of the empathy deficit found in the Violence Inhibition Model (Blair, 2001). 
Linked to this, a lack of emotional processing or inability to allocate attention to 
emotional cues is integral to the Response Modulation Model (Patterson et al., 
1993). This would also fit with the trend identified in the results in which correct 
identification of cognitive and emotional mental states declined with increasing 
characteristics of ASPD. Furthermore, theories of aggression and antisocial 
behaviour suggest that deindividuation  - the reduction of markers of personality – 
makes such behaviour more likely in certain circumstances (Festinger, Pepitone, & 
Newcomb, 1952). Or, it may just be that the non-mentalizing answer was the easiest 
strategy, thus reducing the need to think about more nuanced differences in 
mentalizing answers; this would fit with the low boredom tolerance observed in 
people with ASPD. These are speculative ideas that might explain non-mentalizing; 
further research is required to consider this further. 
The Mind in the Eyes task identified a significant inverse relationship with 
ASPD. In some respects this test taps into similar aspects of mentalization as the 
MASC by assessing ability to recognise mental states from explicit information. As 
mentioned, there have been contradictory studies on this point which may be a 
result of the breadth of the ASPD construct and the preponderance of studies 
focussing on the psychopathic end of the dimension.  
It is suggested here that the range of measures enables an analysis of 
different types of mentalizing in people with ASPD. However, this is not to rule out 
the explanation that these measures are not showing a mentalizing impairment at 
all, but rather, separate cognitive deficits. For example, in developmental terms, 
ASPD shares pathways with ADHD and Autistic Spectrum disorders, which are 
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associated with attentional cognitive impairments, particularly in relation to 
emotional stimuli and missing social signals. However, Glass and Newman (2006) 
showed no differences in the performance of people with ASPD between affect 
recognition and attention (when directed to find a specific emotion). More broadly, 
some researchers suggest that mentalization cannot be separated from executive 
functioning, which is the ability to direct attention, comprehend and integrate 
information. The ongoing debate is represented by Frith and Happe (1994)  arguing 
for the separateness of mentalization and executive function versus others (Jarrold, 
Butler, Cottington, & Jimenez, 2000) suggesting that they are inextricably linked. A 
criteria for the measures used in this study was that demands for executive function 
were balanced across conditions. However, the challenge of achieving this in 
practice is acknowledged and possible interference from this factor was possible. 
As well as the inconsistency between mentalization measures, there is a lack 
of correlation between the behavioural and self-report measures of ASPD, which, 
together with the contrasting predictive models, suggests these may be tapping  into 
different aspects of ASPD. It is interesting that the requirement of the Perspectives 
Task to consider another person‟s view of the world predicts the probation measure. 
This measure is based on interactive behaviours such as recognising the impact on 
the victim of an offence and manipulative, controlling or aggressive actions towards 
others. There is therefore some face validity in this task in relation to ASPD. 
On the other hand, the PAI questionaire, self-rated by participants, is likely to 
under-report ASPD and this might explain the weaker relationship with mentalizing. 
The absence of mentalizing score predicted ASPD (PAI) and it may be that those 
who scored themselves highly on this questionnaire were simply demonstrating a 
lack of psychological insight as to how (negatively) they were representing 
themselves. Alternatively, a dimension of the PAI is Stimulus-Seeking which 
involves a tendency to seek thrills and excitement and is linked to an egocentric 
view of the self. Baumeister et al (1996) suggested that people with violent and 
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antisocial tendencies have unrealistically high and fragile self-esteem. It might be 
hypothesised that this reflects either an absence of mentalizing or hypermentalizing 
in respect of the self, which is likely to be extended to rating mental states in others. 
It appears that at least two different factors of ASPD are being measured by the 
behavioural and the self-report measures, although there can only be tentative 
suggestions as to what this might be at this stage.  
Given the colinearity between the two self-report measures (the PAI and the 
APQ), it is surprising that the latter did not show any relationship with mentalization. 
There is a difference in the factors included in each of these scales, in that the APQ 
gives greater weight to aspects of resentment and aggression. The mean score for 
the APQ also indicated a slightly lower level of ASPD in the sample with less 
spread. It may be that these contrasts explain why the APQ did not replicate the 
finding for the other self-report measure. 
The significant role of certain variables in explaining mentalization or ASPD 
demands attention. When controlled for, IQ and age reduced the correlation of 
certain mentalization measures with ASPD. IQ seems to positively influence 
performance on the MASC and the Mind in the Eyes, but not Perspectives. This is 
consistent with previous studies on the MASC (Dziobek et al., 2006), but contrary to 
conclusions that the Mind in the Eyes is not susceptible to IQ bias (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 2001). This finding supports the collection of IQ information so that it can be 
controlled and, where control groups are recruited, that they are matched. However, 
the poor literacy levels found in this sample meant the WTAR might not have been 
the best  measure of IQ and these observations should, therefore, be treated with 
caution.  
Age contributed to the best model predicting ASPD (PAI) and also partially 
mediated some of the MASC sub-scores relationship to ASPD. It is possible that 
age is to an extent a proxy for mentalization in that it has been shown that 
mentalizing capability increases with age into early adulthood (Dumontheil et al., 
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2010; Blakemore, 2008). The Mental Health Severity scale was the most significant 
predictor of ASPD (PAI). This scale is widely used clinically and includes some 
aspects of the DSM; given the known co-morbidity of ASPD with other Axis I mental 
disorders, this relationship was expected (Ullrich & Coid, 2009). 
This study has several limitations. The lack of a control group has already 
been mentioned. It is also possible that the recruitment method which relied on 
cooperation and referrals from Offender Managers led to some sample bias. The 
measures of ASPD were brief and not based on an in-depth clinical diagnosis using 
DSM or ICD-10 criteria. The Probation measure of ASPD was artificial and therefore 
not generalisable. The measurement of such a broad construct as mentalizing is still 
in the early stages of development, although the discriminitative validity of the 
measures used was encouraging. These mentalizing measures have not been used 
with an offender sample before and there may be confounding aspects in their 
design. For example: the Perspectives task is based on an authority figure (the 
Director), which may motivate negative feelings and reactions in offenders; the 
MASC is based on a „middle class‟ dinner party and this highly ethnically diverse 
sample are likely to vary in their ability to relate to the language and social rules 
presented in the story. The correlational design cannot infer the direction of 
relationships. Finally, the associations found were small and would need replicating 
before expanding on these conclusions. 
This suggests certain avenues for further research. In replicating the design 
with a control group, it would be interesting to develop hypotheses around 
mentalizing and different types of offending behaviour as well as ASPD. The MASC 
has been developed for use with fMRI (Wolf, Dziobek, & Heekeren, 2010) and a 
study to examine the neural correlates of mentalizing in people with ASPD would 
add to neuroscience research in this area, particularly if the non-mentalizing pattern 
was repeated. Further factor analysis comparing the Probation and self-report 
measures of ASPD would be useful in supporting more effective risk assessment 
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tools in forensic services. The lack of support for the secondary hypothesis that a 
stress condition would lead to a temporary reduction in mentalizing may have been 
due to the stress condition not working. Although it was piloted, this was not with an 
offender population and only measured self-rated anxiety, not actual mentalizing 
performance. It would be helpful to repeat this hypothesis but based on a clearer 
understanding of what would raise anxiety in an offender population. 
There are wider scientific and professional implications of this study. Firstly, 
national guidance (Bradley Report, 2009; NICE Clinical Guidelines 77, 2009) 
recommends joint work and responsiblity across the Criminal Justice System and 
the NHS for offenders with mental health problems. The combined use of probation 
and health measures in this study could contribute to the validation and 
improvement of risk assessment tools. Secondly, the types of mentalization 
impairments tentatively pointed to in this study could inform formulations and 
interventions in psychological therapies. This study adds to the broader body of 
research linking specific mentalizing difficulties with particular psychiatric disorders 
and specifically increases knowledge about the etiology of  ASPD. Fourthly, the 
study contributes to developing an effective measure of mentalization by showing 
how an integrated set of computerised tasks may assess a range of mentalizing 
processes.  
 In conclusion, this study used a computerised battery of mentalization 
measures to explore their relationship with ASPD in a sample of offenders. The 
results supported the hypothesis indicating that offenders appear to have specific 
mentalization impairments that are associated with the severity of ASPD. The 
specific mentalizing difficulties identified were perspective-taking, reading the mind 
in the „eyes‟ and non-mentalizing. These need replicating to be more confident of 
their role and contribution to ASPD and/or offending. If these mentalization 
impairments are key processes in ASPD, these findings have the potential to 
improve clinical interventions and risk assessment for public safety.  
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Part 3: Critical Appraisal 
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Introduction 
The appraisal provides the opportunity to reflect on the experience of 
carrying out this study and recommends areas that could be improved for future 
research. The following areas were identified in the empirical paper and will be 
expanded on here. Firstly, research and service development across the NHS and 
the Criminal Justice System (CJS) is a policy imperative for people with ASPD, 
however, such collaboration faces the dilemmas of different priorities and 
contrasting organisational cultures – can these be integrated? Secondly, recruiting a 
sample of people with ASPD was challenging – what can be learnt from the 
experience? Thirdly, whilst psychometric measurement has a language and 
appearance that suggests clarity and coherence, the experience of using the various 
instruments raised questions about what was actually being assessed – what can be 
recommended for future research? Finally, a number of ethical and risk 
management issues are identified. 
 
Research across CJS and NHS 
The Bradley Report (Bradley Report, 2009) and NICE guidance for ASPD 
(NICE Clinical Guidelines 77, 2009) recommend partnership, joint pathways and 
assessment across the CJS and the NHS with joint responsiblity for this population. 
This research demonstrated some of the issues in achieving this alignment. In order 
to recruit the sample via local probation services, approval was required through the 
London Probation Trust (LPT) research governance processes. The research 
proposal needed to demonstrate how it would further their priorities of improved risk 
assessment and public protection. It was interesting to think about how possible 
mentalization impairments might on the one hand signpost potential avenues for 
improved clinical treatment and, on the other, indicate a screening measure for 
public protection.  
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Thinking about how to meet both these objectives was stimulating but also 
presented potential ethical dilemmas in integrating research agendas. The 
information provided to prospective offender participants had a clear clinical 
objective of investigating possible future therapies; the LPT aim of improving public 
safety was not so obvious. As in any organisation, priorities in the LPT are not 
uniform across all levels and departments. Whilst the national priority of public 
protection was recognised within local LPT offices, when the study was presented to 
Borough-based Offender Managers to agree the logistics of the research, they 
wanted the project to improve local access to mental health services for offenders. 
They were concerned about the lack of treatment available and their commitment to 
the research was increased by offering an aggregated (anonymous) mental health 
profile of offenders on license as a by-product of the study. This improved their 
willingness to take on the extra work involved in recruiting participants from their 
caseload as well as being consistent with the research aims of improving services 
for people with ASPD. However, I was also conscious that this information would be 
used with NHS commissioners as a proxy needs assessment to argue for 
investment. 
There were other mutual benefits of establishing the research within the work 
programme of the LPT. For the LPT, they were able to access additional cost-
effective research and to influence the output and dissemination of my findings. At 
the same time, apart from assistance with recruitment, my research was enhanced 
by having access to the LPT information system that improved my screening of 
participants to meet the inclusion criteria and provided an additional measure of 
ASPD.  
The LPT has a data-set to identify possible ASPD, which is used to prioritise 
NHS referrals as well as public protection risk assessments. The research provided 
several interesting avenues for joint work with the LPT. I will be able to provide 
some psychometric assessment of the validity and reliability of this ASPD measure. 
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Secondly, the strongest model for predicting ASPD was the Perspectives task in 
relation to the LPT behavioural measure. It may be that this behavioural measure 
has something to offer the NHS in assessment of ASPD. It is hoped that further 
discussion and dissemination of the findings with LPT colleagues, ideally in joint fora 
with NHS staff, will consider service improvement from this study.  
 
Recruitment 
A possible contradiction in finding a sample of people with ASPD is that, if 
they are willing to participate, then perhaps they do not have strong antisocial 
characteristics. The purpose of recruiting from an offender population was the 
expectation that a large proportion would have an ASPD; epidemiological studies 
have found about 60% of male prisoners have ASPD (Moran, 1999). However, 
ASPD seems to be a broad diagnosis (Bornstein, 1998) and a constant challenge in 
recruitment was to avoid sample bias whilst, at the same time, maximising 
attendance. A lot was learned which may help similar studies in achieving these 
ends. 
Recruitment depended on referrals from Offender Managers, who obtained 
the initial consent to participate. The original means of testing for bias was to collect 
information on those offenders who refused to participate, which could be compared 
with the actual participants to identify any key differences. However, concerns about 
Offender Manager workload meant that this was not implemented. Instead, the 
achieved sample was compared with the London-wide average for some key 
characteristics, gathered from the central information system: level of risk and use of 
aggression or violence in the convicted crime. These items were selected as a proxy 
for antisocial behaviour and the comparison showed a greater than average risk and 
use of violence in the actual sample compared with the overall London average. 
This confirmed that I was not just recruiting the lower risk, more acquiescent 
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offenders and the higher risk felt appropriate given the aim of finding people with 
prominent features of ASPD. 
The experience of recruitment revealed factors which reduced willingness to 
participate. I had thought that clearly positioning myself as a Trainee Clinical 
Psychologist, outside and independent of the Probation service, would encourage 
involvement as offenders would not associate me with the CJS. However, whilst this 
may have been positive for some offenders, I also received feedback that, for 
example: “I had enough people screwing with my head when inside”. Some were 
very wary of seeing anyone with the label of „psychologist‟.  It became important to 
emphasise that no „talking‟ was involved in the assessment and there would be no 
questions about their offence or past history. As well as reticence about a 
psychologist, there was also a concern that the assessment would be like a „test‟ or 
would involve lots of writing. The average age for the sample leaving school was 
16.7 years and there appeared to be a fear that the assessment would show them 
up academically. It has been suggested that shame can be a vulnerability of those 
who commit violent crime, particularly if there is a threat to their inflated but fragile 
self-esteem (Gilligan, 1996). To avoid a fear of failure, the assessment was 
emphasised as only requiring „tick-box‟ or „yes/no‟ answers and including computer 
games. For some, the computerised elements of the assessment were a problem as 
their license conditions stipulated that they were not allowed to use a computer. 
Usually this was resolved by the Offender Manager being briefed and giving an 
exclusion. 
The recruitment strategy included reimbursing participants as a means of 
achieving a cross-section of offenders and minimising the possible confound of an 
altruistic bias in participants. This was also seen as good practice if people are 
going to provide about 2 hours of their time.   A £15 supermarket voucher to cover 
time and transport costs was judged appropriate and accepted as reasonable in the 
ethics submission and by the LPT. It quickly became clear that this sort of 
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reimbursement was not appreciated by offenders with comments such as: “it’s not 
worth my time”. Further discussion revealed that cash was regarded as substantially 
more attractive and would make a difference to the numbers willing to be involved. 
However, the ethical dilemma was a concern that cash would promote spending on 
illicit drugs. However, the LPT did not share this worry (stating that this concern was 
a reality but a cash incentive of this small size would not be a problem) and were 
supportive of cash being used. An amendment to the ethics submission was 
therefore agreed and the change made. This was greatly appreciated by offenders 
as was the practice of providing the money immediately after the assessment; many 
were ready to be upset that some “delaying” paperwork might be required. The 
lingering concern about the reimbursement process was that those offenders who 
most needed some extra income were more likely to come forward. Attempts were 
made to include those offenders who had found work or were in full-time education 
by offering evening appointments but no-one took up this opportunity.  
Maximising attendance was vital if I was not going to waste time amongst a 
group who often had rather chaotic lives or who may decide to do something 
different on the spur of the moment. The cooperation and commitment of Offender 
Managers was instrumental in there being 2 DNAs (2.4%) during the study. 
Appointments were either linked to mandatory attendance at probation offices, or, 
sometimes stipulated as being one of the regular presentations that offenders 
needed to make at their local office. In the high risk hostels, offenders were on a 
behavioural programme which included reward points for beneficial activities; my 
research was designated as one of these recognised activities, which improved 
participation.  
 
Testing/Measures 
 The research revealed a number of measurement issues. The reality of 
using measures can contrast with the expectation arising from the literature and 
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manual. In the study, this contrast was most obvious in the use of the Wechsler Test 
of Adult Reading (WTAR), the measures of ASPD and of mentalization.  
The WTAR provides an estimate of an individual's premorbid intellectual 
functioning and is commonly used to assess cognitive changes since the onset of 
injury or illness (Wechsler, 2001). In this study, it was used as a brief assessment of 
IQ as it is the only reading test normed with the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale -
Third Edition (WAIS–III). The intention was also to use it as a screen for the learning 
difficulties exclusion criterion using a cut-off of 70 (more than 2 standard deviations 
below the mean). However, 10 participants (12%) scored 70 or less. These low 
scores were not consistent with observation of their ability to comprehend task 
instructions or their performance. The low scores were particularly worrying as it has 
been found that the WTAR tends to over-estimate the scores of participants in the 
bottom IQ range (Mathias, Bowden, & Barret-Woodbridge, 2007)! Furthermore, this 
seemed to be a high proportion given that Offender Managers had been asked to 
screen out anyone with learning difficulties.  
The WTAR assesses  stored knowledge and skills (Lezak, 2004) such as 
vocabulary knowledge (Yuspeh, Vanderploeg, & Kershaw, 1998) and reading 
pronunciation skill (Baddeley, Emslie, & Nimmo-Smith, 1992). These may be 
conceptualised as crystallised intelligence (Horn & Cattell, 1967), which depends on 
learning and tends to increase with age. It is probably no coincidence that those 
scoring less than 70 had all left school prior to the age of 16 and had probably opted 
out of involvement in lessons even earlier. The WTAR depends on the normal 
development of reading skills and, in this population, this could not be assumed. 
Although a concern about this measure was picked up quite early, after consultation 
with my academic supervisor, we decided it was too late to change measures. 
Instead, the LPT information system was found to include an assessment of 
Learning Disability and this was used as the exclusion measure. If I was carrying out 
this research again, I would look for a more visual measure of IQ, less reliant on 
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reading ability, such as the Quick Test (Ammons & Ammons, 1962) or Raven‟s 
Progressive Matrices (Raven, Styles, & Raven, 1998) based on perceptual-verbal 
performance. 
Just as measuring intelligence threw up difficulties, so also did the 
measurement of ASPD. There is contention as to whether ASPD is dimensional or 
categorical. Hare (1991) appears to regard it as categorical and the DSM-IV 
guidelines (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) also follow this line of thinking. 
However, this view has been challenged (e.g., Bornstein, 1998) and the DSM-V 
conceptualisation for personality disorders is proposing change to a dimensional 
definition. Given this DSM-V thinking, it was felt appropriate to consider ASPD as a 
continuum. Furthermore, a review of research findings has found that differences 
tend to be at the higher end of performance and the effect sizes can be small: a 
continuous variable was likely to carry more statistical power (Marcus, Lilienfeld, 
Edens, & Poythress, 2006).  
The other interesting issue in relation to the ASPD measures was the lack of 
co-variance between the self-report measures and the LPT behavioural measure. 
This can be looked at in relation to the different factors that have been identified in 
ASPD. For example, a development from Hare‟s (1991) two-factor model of 
psychopathy is Cooke and Michie‟s (2001) three factor hierarchy, which has been 
extensively validated. This suggests that psychopathy is underpinned by: an 
Arrogant and Deceitful Interpersonal Style, Deficient Affective Experience, and an 
Irresponsible Behavioural Style. The advantage of this classification in relation to my 
findings is the possibility that the LPT measure particularly represents the Impulsive 
and Irresponsible Behavioural Style with the 6 items: offence involving threat or 
violence; over-reliance on others for financial support; manipulative or predatatory 
lifestyle; reckless/risk taking behaviour; impulsivity; and, aggressive or controlling 
behaviour. This might explain the difference with the Personality Assessment 
Inventory, which, as well as significant weight to self reported behaviours, also 
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covered aspects of the other two factors with items such as Egocentricity, including 
self-centredness and narcissism, and Stimulus-Seeking involving a tendency to 
seek thrills and excitement with low boredom tolerance. However, this analysis also 
shows that much more research has investigated the construct of psychopathy than 
ASPD and they are not synonomous with each other. 
The extent to which the lack of agreement between the measures might also 
reflect the different viewpoints of offenders and Offender Managers should not be 
ruled out. It is possible that Offender Managers are particularly influenced by past 
records as the best predictor of the future but offenders are hopeful of improved 
behaviour in the future and/or are oblivious of the impact of their lifestyle on others. 
The profile of the person with ASPD does include an empathy deficit (Blair, 2005) or 
a lack of concern for others (Dolan & Fullam, 2004) or an impairment in the ability to 
take another (in this case, the victim‟s) perspective (Perspectives task). Whichever 
of these explanations is correct, the result is a likely disparity between the 
viewpoints of the offender and that of society, here represented by the Offender 
Manager. 
The aim of the literature review that carried through to the empirical paper 
was to find effective ways of measuring mentalization. The breadth of the construct 
and the lack of a recognised test led to the strategy to bring together a battery of 
tests that would assess diverse but complementary aspects of mentalization. If all 
the tests are tapping into different elements of the mentalization construct, one 
would hypothesise that there would be significant correlations between the individual 
measures. There was a significant relationship between the MASC “No 
mentalization” and the Mind in the Eyes measures, but no relationship between 
either of these and the Perspectives Task. 
The correlation in this sample observed for the MASC and the Mind in the 
Eyes contrasts with the results of the original study presenting the MASC which 
drew a distinction between the two (Dziobek et al., 2006). It was suggested that the 
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different stimuli (whole face v eye region) linked to different abilities. On the one 
hand, the ability to decode a whole face (as in the MASC) might use abstract and 
analytical thinking skills whereas the more limited information around the eye region 
prompts a more intuitive emotional response. It has also been suggested that the 
Mind in the Eyes makes relatively low demands on the executive function compared 
with more complex social cognition tasks such as the MASC (Bull, Phillips, & 
Conway, 2008). The latter requires the participant to coordinate multiple 
perspectives and integrate perceived mental states with behaviour. All this requires 
a constant updating of information and the ability to switch attention across a variety  
of stimuli.  Whilst the MASC is more demanding, the covariance found in this study 
might suggest complementary mentalizing abilities are at the root of successful 
performance. Both require an appreciation of how another person might be seeing 
the world and to identify a mental state.   
There was no correlational relationship between the Perspectives task and 
either the MASC or the Mind in the Eyes. This might be interpreted as mentalization 
not being a unified construct or that one or more of these tests was not measuring 
mentalization. The Perspectives task is labelled as a Theory of Mind (ToM) task 
and, although the literature review describes the significant overlap that ToM has 
with mentalization, this task seems to be more purely cognitive than other complex 
ToM tasks. The task requires participants to represent another person‟s perspective, 
but it does not necessitate putting oneself into the „feeling‟ or „intentions‟ part of their 
mind. The „thinking about feeling‟ component of mentalization is missing. However, 
the task was the strongest predicter of ASPD and, if it isn‟t a mentalization test, what 
is it measuring?  
Allen et al (2008) suggest that there are two important processes in 
mentalization – attention and imagination. Attention requires effortful control to be 
able to move away from one‟s natural egocentric inclination. Imagination is needed 
in order to wonder what is going on in the mind of oneself and other people. The 
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Perspectives task seems to demand attention but only a little imagination. Whilst the 
other tasks require much more imagination in relation to what others are thinking 
and feeling. Breaking down the complex processes involved in mentalization may be 
a better way of working out what the most appropriate measures should be. 
A criteria for the selection of mentalization measures was their ecological 
validity, that is, their relevance to real world tasks. The MASC includes questions of 
social understanding that people would generally require in order to problem-solve 
in complex social situations. The Perspectives test, whilst a little artificial, mimics a 
real-life demand of following instructions from the viewpoint of another person. 
However, the idea that these tests are “real” in the same way for all people is 
debatable. It raises questions arising from a view of cognitive development as 
domain-specific (Karmiloff-Smith, 1994), that these measures may be more or less 
relevant for different groups of people depending on the social construction of their 
particular worlds (Vygotsky, 1978). For people with ASPD, the social challenge of a 
middle class dinner party (as in the MASC) may stimulate a different level of 
engagement to, for example, a violent street exchange or an encounter between 
people in a supermarket. Similarly, the picture of a white authority figure giving 
instructions in the Perspectives task may have a different meaning for men of 
various ages and different ethnic backgrounds. The challenge for naturalistic 
measures is to avoid environmental or cultural confounds. If I were to repeat this 
research, I would look at these measures representing social situations more 
consistent with the milieu of the participants. 
 
Ethical issues and risk management 
As a researcher directly administering the tests, there should be no 
unintended effect on the performance of participants. In being aware of this, I 
became unsure as to how to deal with variation in the motivation and interest of 
participants. I started with the expectation that I would inevitably play a motivating 
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role. The assessment battery lasted almost 2 hours and I was keen to maintain the 
effort and interest of participants so that they would do themselves equal justice in 
what they were individually capable of. However, I began to question this and 
wondered whether interest in the task and doing one‟s best were facets of 
mentalization (similar to Allen‟s effortful attention). Therefore, if my attention varied 
across participants dependent on a perception of their relative motivation, then I was 
possibly having an inappropriate influence on their results. In a sense, my 
mentalizing may be adding to theirs. 
Even when aware of this possible confound, treating everyone exactly the 
same is probably impossible as individual participants will inevitably elicit different 
types of responses from the researcher. These are likely to have nuanced effects on 
performance. There is probably also a thin line between an assessment that picks 
up general aspects of antisocial behaviour, for example, a failure to conform to 
social norms and impulsivity, against a specific response that represents a disregard 
for, or impatience with, the assessment process. 
 Although all participants should have received the same information sheet in 
advance of their appointment, there was some variation in expectations. Many 
expressed surprise and then impatience at the amount of time the assessment 
would take. This could put pressure on the researcher to shortcut some of the 
standardised instruction. Others were curious about the research and were keen to 
discuss the direction of questions and their performance in the session. This was 
normally managed by allowing time at the end of the assessment for discussion and 
offering feedback at the end of the research process. It was tempting to consider 
using comments made by participants during the assessment for additional 
qualitative information but, on reflection, the spontaneous unstructured approach to 
this meant it felt inappropriate and possibly unethical. For example, one participant 
exclaimed at the beginning of the Mind in the Eyes task: “how can you tell what 
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people are feeling from their eyes, you’re not making sense, man”. This was a telling 
statement regarding the point of this task, but not representative of comments. 
 
Conclusion: research improvements 
 There are a number of learning points for future studies. For multi-agency 
research, collaboration makes for more than the sum of the parts. By early 
involvement of partner organisations, the policy aims of all parties can be integrated 
and may add to the richness of what might arise from the research. By early 
involvement too, the logistical issues can be addressed so that recruitment can be 
maximised. In working with staff at the front-line, if day-to-day workload pressures 
can be considered and procedures adapted, this is more likely to maintain the 
working relationships that are needed to support the research. The recruitment 
logistics can be designed so that biases and differences in motivation are minimised 
and numbers of participants optimised. 
 The design of appropriate measures should ideally be piloted. In identifying a 
measure of IQ, the characteristics of the sample should be considered to ensure 
that other possibilities, such as the length of formal education, are not accounting for 
variance. The measurement of ASPD and mentalization are complex. Given the 
breadth of ASPD, it may be helpful to think about the underlying factors that make 
up the construct. The measurement of ASPD has been under-researched in contrast 
with psychopathy and there may be opportunities to address this in relation to the 
proposed DSM-V criteria. There is also scope for research to consider the reasons 
for differences in self-report versus observational assessment of ASPD. There is an 
opportunity for joint work across the NHS and CJS in developing effective 
assessment measures.  
 Mentalization is also complex and multi-dimensional as a construct. Using a 
battery of complementary tests seemed to be useful, but could have been improved 
on by: (a) being clearer as to what underlying aspect of mentalization each test was 
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assessing; and, (b) a rationale as to how the tests combine to represent the 
construct. In common with much psychological research the unwanted influence of 
the researcher needs to be controlled, however, the additional risk in a study of 
mentalization is the researcher‟s own mentalizing, which should be as neutral as 
possible. 
From my personal perspective, the following issues arise from the study and 
could be on the joint NHS/CJS agenda. Firstly, the high level of mental health need 
as measured for Axis 1 conditions by the Brief Symptom Inventory (GSI T-
score=59.5) and for ASPD and BPD as measured by the Personality Assessment 
Inventory (ASPD T-score=65; BPD T-score=63) suggests thought be given to 
treatment as part of rehabilitation plans. Secondly, a more integrated approach to 
risk assessment may produce improved tools for both services as well as helping to 
forge a common language. Thirdly, the main implications for therapy and 
rehabilitation programmes are to better target the two impairments suggested by this 
research to increase with severity of ASPD: (a) the „non-mentalizing‟ way of thinking; 
and (b), the greater tendency to use one‟s own perspective at the cost of seeing 
other people‟s viewpoints. 
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Appendix A1 
Results from Literature Search: Identified Measures of Mentalization (n=27) 
 
Measure No:
16
 
Studies by clinical condition 
& 1
st
 author 
Type of 
measure
17
 
Facial Emotion 
recognition (Ekman 
et al., 1976) 
4 Autism
18
: (Kleinman et al., 2001)  
Autonomic Failure: (Heims et al, 2004)  
Epilepsy: (Farrant et al., 2005)  
Schizophrenia
19
: (Bommer & Brune, 2006)  
Emotion 
Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index 
(Davis, 1983a)  
5 ASPD:  (Dolan & Fullam, 2004)  
Autism: (Shamay-Tsoory, 2008); (Kleinman et al., 
2001)  
Depression: (Wilbertz et al, 2010)  
Schizophrenia: (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007)  
Empathy 
False Belief Task 
(Perner et al., 1985)  
10 Alzheimer‟s: (Fernandez-Duque et al, 2009); 
(Gregory et al., 2002)  
Autism: (Umeda et al, 2010); (Frith & Happe, 1999)  
Brain Damage: (Surian & Siegal, 2001); (Siegal, et 
al, 1996)  
Dementia: (Lough et al., 2001)  
Schizophrenia: (de Achaval et al., 2010); (Chung et 
al, 2008); (Tager-Flusberg et al, 1998)  
ToM 
Ice Cream False 
Belief task (Baron-
Cohen, 1989)  
2 Frontal leucotomy: (Bach et al., 1998)  
Schizophrenia: (Drury et al, 1998)  
ToM 
Strange Stories 
(Happe, 1994; 
Happe et al., 1999) 
16 Autism: (Umeda et al., 2010); (Spek et al, 2010); 
(Happe, 1997)  
Autonomic Failure: (Heims et al., 2004)  
Bipolar Disorder: (Olley et al., 2005)  
Brain damage: (Bibby & McDonald, 2005); (Bird et 
al, 2004)  
Epilepsy: (Shaw et al., 2007); (Farrant et al., 2005)  
Psychopathy: (Blair et al., 1996)  
Schizophrenia: (Langdon & Ward, 2009); (Mazza et 
al, 2008); (Chung et al., 2008)  
Frontal leucotomy: (Bach et al., 1998)  
Huntingdon‟s: (Snowden et al., 2003)  
Tourette‟s Syndrome: (Channon et al, 2004)  
ToM 
Hinting Task 
(Corcoran et al., 
1995)  
6 Autism: (Craig et al, 2004)  
Bipolar Disorder: (Kerr et al, 2003); 
Schizophrenia: (Stewart et al, 2008); (Fiszdon et al, 
ToM 
                                                     
16
 No: The number of studies using the measure from the literature search. This does not add up to 27 
as many studies used more than one measure. 
17
 Type of measure is defined in line with the literature search: Theory of Mind (ToM); Emotional 
Intelligence (EI). Where the authors explicitly referred to a different construct, this is used, for 
example, emotion recognition or social cognition. 
18
 Autism is used here to include studies referring to High Functioning Autism and Asperger‟s 
Syndrome. 
19
 Schizophrenia is used here to include studies referring to paranoia, delusions, psychosis. 
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2007); (Corcoran & Frith, 2005); (Craig et al., 2004). 
 
Reading the mind in 
the eyes (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1997; 
2001)  
22 Alzheimer‟s: (Gregory et al., 2002)  
Anorexia: (Russell et al, 2009)  
ASPD: (Dolan et al., 2004)  
Autism: (Spek et al., 2010); (Craig et al., 2004); 
(Kleinman et al., 2001); (Jarrold et al., 2000)  
Brain injury: (Havet-Thomassin et al, 2006); (Stone 
et al, 2003)  
Dementia: (Torralva et al, 2009); (Lough et al., 
2001)  
Depression: (Harkness et al, 2005)  
Epilepsy: (Farrant et al., 2005)  
Sex Offenders: (Elsegood & Duff, 2010)  
Schitzotypy: (Gooding et al, 2010)  
Schizophrenia: (Schimansky et al, 2010); (de 
Achaval et al., 2010); (Couture et al, 2008); (Kettle 
et al, 2008); (Addy et al, 2007); (Craig et al., 2004)  
Williams Syndrome: (Tager-Flusberg et al., 1998)  
ToM 
Bell Lysaker 
Emotion Recognition 
Test (Bell et al., 
1997)  
2 Schizophrenia: (Fiszdon et al., 2007) 
Substance misuse 
EI 
Picture Sequencing 
Story-telling task 
(Langdon et al., 
1997)  
5 Alexithymia: (Wastell & Taylor, 2002)  
Schizophrenia: (Langdon et al., 2009); (Brakoulias 
et al., 2008); (Addy et al., 2007); (Langdon et al 
2010)  
ToM 
Picture Stories 
Inference Intention 
Task (Sarfati et al., 
1997)  
4 Brain Injury: (Havet-Thomassin et al., 2006)  
Schizophrenia: (Chung et al., 2008); (Sarfati et al, 
1999); (Benedetti et al., 2009)  
ToM 
Social Attribution 
Task (Klin, 2000)  
1 Autism Social 
Cognition 
Abbreviated 
Trustworthiness 
Task (Adolphs et al., 
1998; 2001) 
1 Schizophrenia: (Couture et al., 2008)  ToM 
Emotional 
Intelligence (Schutte 
et al., 1998) 
3 BPD: (Gardner & Qualter, 2009)  
Mood disorder: (Guastello et al, 2004)  
Substance Misuse: (Riley & Schutte, 2003)  
EI 
Faux Pas (Stone et 
al., 1998)  
15 Alzheimer‟s: (Gregory et al., 2002)  
ASPD: (Dolan et al., 2004)  
Autism: (Umeda et al., 2010); (Spek et al., 2010); 
(Zalla et al, 2009)  
Brain damage: (Lee et al., 2010); (Bird et al., 2004); 
(Stone et al., 2003)  
Dementia: (Torralva et al., 2009); (Lough et al., 
2001)  
Epilepsy: (Shaw et al., 2007); (Farrant et al., 2005)  
ToM 
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Schizophrenia: (de Achaval et al., 2010); (Stewart 
et al., 2008); (Martino et al, 2007)  
Cartoon Task 
(Happe et al., 1999) 
7 Anorexia: (Russell et al., 2009)  
Bipolar Disorder: (Olley et al., 2005)  
Brain Injury: (Bibby et al., 2005)  
Epilepsy: (Farrant et al., 2005)  
Huntingdon‟s: (Snowden et al., 2003)  
Schizophrenia: (Langdon et al., 2009); (Brakoulias 
et al., 2008)  
ToM 
Predicaments test 
(Channon et al., 
1999)  
2 Brain damage: (Channon & Crawford, 2000)  
Tourette‟s Syndrome: (Channon et al., 2004)  
Problem-
solving 
MSC EIT (Mayer et 
al., 2003)  
12 Alexythmia: (Lumley et al., 2005)  
BPD: (Gardner et al., 2009)  
Brain Injury: (Krueger et al., 2009)  
HIV: (Willard, 2006)  
Mental disorder (inc. depression, substance 
misuse, BPD): (Hertel et al, 2009)  
Schizophrenia: (Eack et al., 2010); (Lo et al., 2010); 
(Eack et al., 2009); (Kee et al., 2009)  
Schizotypy: (Aguirre et al, 2008)  
Sex Offenders: (Puglia et al, 2005)  
Social Anxiety: (Jacobs et al., 2008) 
EI 
Awkward Moments 
Test (Heavey et al., 
2000)  
1 Autism ToM 
Animations Task  
(Castelli et al, 2000)  
1 Schizophrenia: (Horan et al., 2009)  ToM 
Projective 
Imagination Test 
(Blackshaw et al., 
2001)  
2 Schizophrenia: (Stewart et al, 2009); (Moore et al., 
2006)  
ToM 
Cartoon False Belief 
Task (Woolfe et al., 
2002)  
2 Aphasia: (Varley et al, 2001) 
Deafness: (Morgan & Kegl, 2006)  
ToM 
False Belief Stories 
Task (Corcoran et 
al., 2003)  
2 Schizophrenia: (Addy et al., 2007); (Walston et al, 
2000) 
ToM 
Cartoon Picture 
Stories (Brune et al., 
2005). Described as 
a development of 
Langdon et al., 
1997. 
2 Schizophrenia: (Brune et al., 2008); (Bommer et al., 
2006)  
ToM 
Sarcasm 
Comprehension 
Task (Channon et 
al., 2005)  
1 Head Injury ToM 
Movie for Assessing 1 Autism: (Dziobek et al, 2006) Social 
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Social Cognition 
(Dziobek et al., 
2006)  
Bipolar: (Montag et al., 2010)  
BPD: (Sharp et al., 2011) 
Brain Study: (Wolf et al, 2010) 
Depression: (Wilbertz et al., 2010)  
Stress: (Smeets et al, 2009; Wolf et al., 2010)  
cognition 
Cambridge Face-
Voice Battery (Golan 
et al., 2006)  
1 Autism ToM 
Yoni Cartoon Eye 
gaze inference task 
(Shamay-Tsoory et 
al., 2007) 
20
 
2 Autism: (Shamay-Tsoory, 2008)  
Envy: (Shamay-Tsoory et al, 2007)   
ToM 
 
 
                                                     
20
 This was developed from Baron-Cohen (1995). 
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Appendix B2 
 
 
RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF CLINICAL, 
EDUCATIONAL AND HEALTH 
PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
 
Information Sheet & Consent Form 
Invitation to take part in a Research Project: 
 
My name is John Helps. I am training as a Clinical Psychologist in the NHS, based at 
University College London.  
 
I am inviting you to take part in the research study described below. Please take time to read 
the following information and ask me if there is anything that is not clear to you or if you 
would like further information. Take time to decide whether you would like to take part. 
 
Purpose: To find out if people who have committed crimes, particularly antisocial or violent 
acts, think about other people differently to the rest of the population. The results may 
improve ways of helping offenders and professionals in their work 
 
Who we would like to take part: You have been chosen because of your previous contact 
with the law. I have been given your name by a professional involved with your case. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you agree to take part, an appointment will be arranged with you. 
You will be able to discuss the project further and be asked to sign a consent form that you 
are willing to participate. 
You will fill in a few forms with me and then do some computer tasks – most people find 
these enjoyable.  
It will take about 2 hours. 
To recognise your time, you will be given a £10 voucher (or up to £15 if you have travelled 
for the appointment) for a local supermarket. 
If you wish, you will be sent a summary of the findings. 
 
What are the risks of taking part? 
Any information collected about you during this study will only be used for the purposes of 
this study. Data will be confidential and will not include your name. It will not be possible to 
link your data results to you. It will not be passed onto the Probation Service (or any other 
organisation). 
Your study data will not affect your probation conditions.  
Apart from the Probation service, no other people will be informed of your participation in this 
study. 
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You will not be asked anything about your crime. However, if you do tell me about any 
offences that are not known, or suggest anything that is a risk to others, I will be obliged to 
disclose this information to a professional involved in your case. 
 
Do I have to take part? No. You should only take part if you want to. Whether or not you 
take part will not disadvantage you in any way or affect your probation conditions or 
sentence. If you decide to take part, you will be free to withdraw during the task at any time 
without giving a reason; all information collected to that point will be deleted. 
 
What if I have any concerns or worries or wish to make a complaint? 
Please let me (John Helps) know, and I will do my best to answer your questions. 
If you wish to complain about the conduct of me (the Researcher) or how you are treated in 
this study, you should write, setting out your concerns, to: Dr J. Feigenbaum, Senior 
Lecturer, Research Department of Clinical, Educational and Health Psychology, University 
College London, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT. 
 
Contact Details of Chief Investigator: 
John Helps 
Tel: 07979 770936 
Email: jnewburyhelps@yahoo.co.uk 
 
 
Notes: 
a) This study has been approved by the NWLondon Rec 2 Research Ethics 
Committee, a group of academics and Researchers to make sure your safety, 
rights, well-being and dignity are all protected (Project ID Number: 
10/H0720/57). 
b) This study has also been reviewed and given approval by the London Probation 
Service. 
c) This research is funded by University College London, the University of London 
and the NHS. 
d) The Chief Investigator is bound by strict professional guidelines on 
confidentiality by the British Psychological Society and University College 
London. 
e) All data will be collected and stored in accordance with the Data Protection Act 
1998. 
 
 
Information Sheet Version 6 20/08/2010
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Informed Consent Form for Participants in Research Studies 
 
Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet and discussed any questions 
you might have about the research. 
 
Title of Project:    Investigating impairments in mentalisation amongst people with offending 
behaviour. 
 
This study has been approved by the NWLondon Rec 2 Research Ethics Committee (Project ID No: 
10/H0720/57). 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organising the 
research must explain the project to you before you agree to take part. 
If you have any questions arising from the Information Sheet or explanation already 
given to you, please ask the Chief Investigator before you agree to join in. 
You will be given a copy of this Consent Form together with the Information Sheet 
to keep and refer to at any time. 
 I understand that if I decide during the research task that I no longer wish to 
participate in this project, I can notify the Chief Investigator and be 
withdrawn immediately. 
 I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of 
this research study. I understand that such information will be treated as 
strictly confidential and handled in accordance with the provisions of the 
Data Protection Act 1998. 
 I understand that the information I have submitted will be published as a 
report and I will be sent a copy, if requested. Confidentiality and anonymity 
will be maintained and it will not be possible to identify me from any 
publications. 
Participants Statement 
I, ...............................................................................................(Name printed) 
Agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my satisfaction and I 
agree to take part in the study, I have read both the notes written above and the Information Sheet 
about the project, and understand what the research involves. 
 
Signed: ...........................................               Date: ..................................... 
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Chief Investigator’s Statement 
I, John Helps 
Confirm that I have carefully explained the purpose of the study to the participant and outlined any 
foreseeable risks or benefits (where applicable). 
 
Signed: .........................................                 Date: ..................................... 
 
CF Version 5. 24/08/2010 
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Appendix B3 
 
Perspectives Instructions 
 
First Part 
 
This experiment is investigating people’s ability to follow instructions on the 
computer.  
 
Here is an example of what you will see [showing picture example]. You will be 
presented with a grid with several objects located in the slots. The director, who 
is on the other side of the grid, will give you instructions on which objects to 
move and where to move them. As you can see, there are several covered slots. 
You are able to see the objects in these slots, but the director cannot.  
 
This is how things look for the director [show slide of the array from director’s 
point of view]. The director does not know what is behind the covered slots, so it 
will be important to take his point of view into account when you follow his 
instructions.  
 
[Go back to the first screen] For example you can see the car, and because this 
slot is not covered, [Go to the director’s point of view screen], the director can 
see the car too. 
 
[Go back to the first screen] Let’s do another one. You can see the red apple, 
but because this slot is covered, [Go to the director’s point of view screen], the 
director cannot see the apple.  
 
[Go back to the first screen] Can you show me another object which the director 
cannot see? [Wait for a response] … Yes that’s right [Go to the director’s point of 
view screen], the director cannot see the telephone/watch/nail varnish.  
 
[Go back to the first screen] Now can you show me an object that the director 
can see? [Wait for a response]…  [Go to the director’s point of view screen], yes 
that’s right the director can see the scissors/person/car/goose. 
 
[Repeat until it seems the child understands]. 
 
So remember, when you follow the director’s instructions, it’s important to take 
his point of view into account. 
 
Your task is to listen to the director’s instructions and then “move” the object by 
clicking the mouse pointer on the object and sliding it to the correct slot. You will 
always be asked to move the object by one slot, for example one slot to the 
right, or one slot to the left.  
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The instructions given by the director should be taken from your point of view, 
[Go back to the first screen] so if the director asks you to move the scissors left 
for example, you need to move the scissors towards your left, i.e. this side. Can 
you see we wrote Left and Right on those pieces of paper? It is to help you.  
 
[Demonstrate example of moving person up]. 
 
Can you try? What should do if the directory says “move the car right” ? [Check 
that the child click and drag the mouse pointer correctly]. 
 
You should do this as quickly and as accurately as possible. When you click on 
them, the objects won’t actually move, but you should act and move the mouse 
as if they did.  
 
If for some reason you don’t respond quickly enough the experiment will move 
on automatically. If that happens, don’t worry – you should just respond to the 
next instruction and not try to catch up. 
 
 
 
Second part 
 
Now you are going to do something similar to the task where you were moving 
objects earlier. 
 
This time the director is not going to be there anymore. 
 
As you can see, several of the slots have dark grey backgrounds, whereas most 
of them are clear. You are going to hear instructions to move the objects. These 
instructions only refer to items in the clear slots. They do not refer to objects in 
the grey slots.  
 
So you have to ignore the objects in the grey slots. It will be important to take 
this into account when you follow the instructions.  
 
Can you show me a slot with a grey background?  [Let them answer] And a slot 
with a clear background? [Let them answer] 
 
Is it all clear ? [Show the next slide with relational trials]. If I said move the top 
truck right, what would you do ? [Check they do the correct thing and ignore the 
truck in the grey background. If not clear, explain again.] 
 
Great, now we’ll start this part of the experiment. 
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Appendix B4 
Meeting with Hounslow Probation Service 
Research Summary: “Are there mentalisation impairments in people 
with Antisocial Personality Disorder?” 
 
Overview 
 
There is little evidence for the effective treatment of people with Antisocial 
Personality Disorder (ASPD)(NICE,2009). The aim of this study is to explore 
possible mentalisation deficits in people with ASPD, which might support 
emerging clinical interventions. 
 
Mentalisation is the ability to understand and take on what is going on in one’s 
own and other people’s minds, eg to judge their perspective or intentions; to 
read their emotional state; to understand social nuance such as irony or faux 
pas. 
 
Research Design 
 
1) Sample: 84 male clients being supervised by Probation services in West 
& NW London (Brent, Ealing, Harrow, Hillingdon and Hounslow), from the 
ages of 18 and whose first language is English.  
Exclusions: people with characteristics that have known associations with 
mentalisation impairments, that is: schizophrenia; severe depression or 
autistic spectrum disorders. Information will also be collected on 
participants in order to control for certain variables: brain injury, 
psychotropic medication; Axis I Mental Health disorders; illicit drug 
taking. 
 
2) Recruitment:  
 
The Researcher linking with appointments being made with SPOs so that 
possible participants are asked at the time of a regular appointment 
whether they would like to take part. A research appointment could be 
made to take place according to available schedule. 
 
Participants will be offered a £15 supermarket voucher if they complete 
the assessment. This is felt to be an appropriate recognition of the time 
they will be giving up and in line with recognised good practice for user 
involvement. It will also optimise take-up for the study. 
 
3) Experiment: an individualised battery of mentalisation tests to be 
administered to measure ability to understand others’ emotional and 
cognitive states. 
a. 3 or 4 questionnaires; 
b. 4 tests/computer games; 
c. There is no discussion of previous history or offences; 
d. Overall time required is about 2 hours. 
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Potential Benefits of Research 
 
The research is aiming to enhance understanding of the behaviour of people with 
ASPD, based on a hypothesis that there is an impairment in their ability to read 
and understand other people’s intentions and/or emotional states. Such an 
analysis may help to: 
 
 Develop evidence-based treatments. There is little evidence for the 
effective treatment of people with ASPD (NICE,2009). The Bradley 
report (2009) recommends further efforts are made to divert 
those with mental health difficulties out of the Criminal Justice 
System into treatment. Mentalisation-based Therapy has 
demonstrated benefits for people with Borderline Personality 
Disorder and there is reason to believe that some groups of 
people with ASPD have similar characteristics. 
 Enhance risk assessment. Actuarial risk assessment tools are 
improving prediction of risk and this research may help improve 
definition of characteristics with associated measurement tools to 
build into these methods. 
 A by-product for local probation services is the possibility of an 
aggregated and anonymous mental health profile of participants. 
 
 
 
Researcher: John Helps 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
07979 770936 
j.newbury-helps@nhs.net 
20th September 2010 
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ANOVA 
Model 
Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 1122.850 1 1122.850 13.528 .000a 
 Residual 6307.916 76 82.999   
 Total 7430.767 77    
2 Regression 1644.339 2 822.170 10.656 .000b 
 Residual 5786.427 75 77.152   
 Total 7430.767 77    
3 Regression 1978.483 3 659.494 8.951 .000c 
 Residual 5452.284 74 73.680   
 Total 7430.767 77    
 
Coefficients 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Std‟ized 
Coeff 
  95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta 
t Sig. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
1 (Constant) 69.318 4.354   .000 60.646 77.991 
 BSI GSI .262 .071 .389 3.678 .000 .120 .403 
2 (Constant) 76.621 5.051  15.169 .000 66.558 86.683 
 BSI GSI .272 .069 .404 3.956 .000 .135 .409 
 Age in years -.238 .092 -.265 -2.600 .011 -.421 -.056 
3 (Constant) 73.640 5.131  14.353 .000 63.417 83.864 
 BSI GSI .256 .068 .380 3.785 .000 .121 .390 
 Age in years -.200 .091 -.223 -2.192 .032 -.382 -.018 
 MASC None % .338 .159 .217 2.130 .037 .022 .654 
APPENDIX B5  
 
Regression Analysis for Dependent Variable PAI ASPD 
Model Summary 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R 
Square 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R 
Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .389a .151 .140 9.110 .151 13.528 1 76 .000 
2 .470b .221 .201 8.784 .070 6.759 1 75 .011 
3 .516c .266 .237 8.584 .045 4.535 1 74 .037 
a. Predictors: (Constant), BSI Global Severity Index     
b. Predictors: (Constant), BSI Global Severity Index, Age in years 
c. Predictors: (Constant), BSI Global Severity Index, Age in years, MASC None % 
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